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ABSTRACT 
Enhancing Therapists’ Clinical Judgments of Client Progress  
Subsequent to Objective Feedback 
 
By 
 
Michael M. Haderlie 
 
Dr. Chrisopher Heavey, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor of Psychology 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
  
 Although it is intuitive that the judgments made by mental-health clinicians 
become increasingly accurate as they gain clinical experience, research has demonstrated 
only minimal effects of experience on clinical judgment. Feedback regarding the 
accuracy of judgments is widely considered to be an essential component in developing 
clinical judgment. However, very little research has systematically examined whether the 
provision of feedback following judgments leads to increased judgment accuracy. The 
current research explored the effects of providing feedback to therapists regarding client 
progress on the accuracy of therapists’ judgments of change. The effect of feedback on 
therapists’ confidence ratings regarding such judgments was also examined.  Ten 
therapists at two on-campus outpatient clinics were randomly assigned to feedback (FB) 
or no-feedback (NFB) conditions.  Immediately following each therapy session, 
therapists made judgments regarding the direction and magnitude of client progress.  
Therapists in the FB condition subsequently received feedback regarding clients’ 
progress based upon a self-report measure of distress.  The small size of the sample and 
correspondingly low statistical power made significance testing impractical.  Thus the 
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results were examined in terms of effect sizes and should be considered exploratory.  
Results suggested that feedback did not improve judgment accuracy, as therapists in the 
NFB condition demonstrated greater improvement in accuracy over time.  Therapists 
were found to be generally overconfident regarding the accuracy of their judgments.  
Feedback tended to reduce confidence ratings over time.  Additionally, clients of 
therapists in the FB condition appeared to improve at a faster rate than clients of 
therapists in the NFB condition, consistent with previous research regarding the 
therapeutic effects of progress feedback.  Finally, the number of judgments made by 
individual therapists was positively related to judgment accuracy, suggesting that 
repetition with the specific judgment task was beneficial.  Results are discussed in terms 
of applications of feedback in training settings and directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 The clinical judgments made by mental-health clinicians, and the process by 
which such judgments are made, have long been a source of empirical scrutiny (e.g., 
Meehl, 1954).  Clinical judgment entails a process of integrating data and observations 
that has been described as informal, subjective, and impressionistic (Bell & Mellor, 
2009).  A large body of research in the field of psychology is related to the relative merits 
of the clinical approach to decision making as compared to statistical techniques.  In such 
research, the validity (accuracy) of decisions made on the basis of clinical judgment is 
compared to the validity of decisions reached through the application of statistical 
methods.  Results have consistently favored formulaic, statistical techniques (e.g., 
Ægisdóttir et al., 2006; Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 2000; Meehl, 1954), 
leading some to conclude that clinical judgment is seriously flawed and unreliable (e.g., 
Dawes, 1994; Faust & Ziskin, 1988). 
  A closely related research question has been the extent to which clinicians 
develop improved clinical judgment as they acquire clinical experience.  Although it 
seems intuitive that clinicians become more accurate in their decisions with experience, 
most results have not generally supported such a relationship (Dawes, 1989, 1994; Faust, 
1994; Faust & Ziskin, 1988; Garb, 1998; Garb & Boyle, 2003; Wedding & Faust, 1989).  
Didactic training specific to judgment tasks (e.g., training in the MMPI) does result in 
improved judgmental accuracy when clinicians are compared to lay judges with no such 
training; however, additional clinical experience beyond initial training has rarely 
resulted in subsequent increases in the validity of judgments (reviewed in Garb, 1998).  
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Recent meta-analytic results (Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, Maugherman, et al., 2009) 
suggest that experience may in fact have a small positive effect overall on clinical 
judgment. 
 The relative inferiority of clinical judgment as compared to statistical techniques, 
coupled with the widely-accepted view that clinical judgment does not improve with 
experience (Lichtenberg, 1997), has led to skepticism toward clinical judgment among 
many researchers in the field of psychology.  Westen and Weinberger (2004) coined the 
term clinicism (cynicism toward the clinician) to refer to a belief that little may be 
learned from clinical practice or experience.  The degree to which such a belief is actually 
held has been debated (e.g., Garb & Grove, 2005).  At any rate, researchers have 
increasingly recognized the need to move beyond descriptions of the limitations and 
flaws of clinical judgment in order to develop practices designed to improve clinical 
judgment.  Such efforts are especially important given that clinical judgment is often 
considered the foundation of clinical practice (Ridley & Shaw-Ridley, 2009).  
Additionally, adequate statistical models have not been developed for a majority of the 
decisions made by clinicians.  Therefore, the ability of clinicians to apply clinical 
judgment in making valid judgments for individual clients remains of utmost importance.   
 Relatively little research has evaluated systematic efforts to increase the accuracy 
of clinical judgment.  Bell and Mellor (2009) noted that “although the debate over 
clinical versus statistical prediction may have achieved a significant degree of theoretical 
sophistication, it has largely failed to guide clinicians in improving their judgement [sic] 
accuracy” (p.  114).  One potential method of improving clinical judgment is specific 
training regarding assessment procedures that incorporate research on judgment and 
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decision making.  Although such methods have received only limited attention, some 
preliminary evidence suggests that such didactic training may lead to increased judgment 
accuracy (Meier, 1999; Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, Maugherman, et al., 2009). 
 Perhaps the most frequently-suggested means of improving clinical judgment is 
the provision of corrective feedback during training on judgment tasks.  Many authors 
(e.g., Faust, 1991; Garb, 1998; Lichtenberg, 1997) have argued that it is hard for 
clinicians to learn from their clinical experience because they do not receive feedback.  
Garb and Grove (2005) suggested that even when practitioners do receive feedback, it is 
often biased and subjective.  Some decision-making models (e.g., the terminal insight 
model; Dawes, 1994) suggest that it is impossible for clinicians to improve the validity of 
their judgments without receiving feedback.  Sapyta, Riemer, and Bickman (2005) 
compared clinical training that does not include feedback to attempting to learn archery 
while blindfolded.  Spengler (1998) asserted, “To ensure judgment accuracy as a local 
clinical scientist, some form of feedback mechanism is needed” (p.  932). 
 Despite the widely-held belief that feedback is a necessary ingredient in the 
development of clinical judgment, research examining the effects of feedback on clinical 
judgment is surprisingly rare.  Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, Maugherman, and colleagues’ 
(2009) meta-analysis of 75 clinical judgment studies included only two studies in which 
feedback about accuracy was included as a potential moderator of judgment accuracy.  
Additionally, judgment studies that systematically vary the availability of feedback have 
rarely been conducted (Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, & Maugherman, 2009). 
 The purpose of the current research was to examine the effects of feedback on the 
accuracy of clinical judgments through an experimental design.  The specific type of 
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clinical judgment examined was judgments about client progress over the course of 
psychotherapy.  Although judgment research has largely focused on decisions made 
during the initial stage of therapy (e.g., diagnosis, treatment planning), the continuous 
and accurate evaluation of client response throughout therapy is essential to positive 
therapy outcomes (Hatfield & Ogles, 2006).  Decisions regarding the course of therapy, 
alterations to the treatment plan, and the timing of termination are based on the 
clinician’s judgment of client progress.  Clinicians generally make such judgments on the 
basis of relatively subjective indicators including behavioral observations or clients’ self-
reports of change.  However, the use of outcome measures as an aid in monitoring client 
progress has become increasingly common (Hatfield & Ogles, 2004).  A significant body 
of research indicates that the use of outcome measures throughout therapy leads to 
improved clinical outcomes, especially for clients who initially do not respond well to 
treatment (Brodey et al., 2005; Lambert, 2007; Slade et al., 2006).  Given such positive 
effects of feedback on client outcomes, as well as the widely-held belief that feedback is 
positively related to judgment, it was hypothesized that feedback regarding outcome 
questionnaires results in improvements in clinical judgment. 
 In the present study, the accuracy of clinicians’ judgments regarding their clients’ 
progress in therapy was evaluated.  A standardized outcome questionnaire was utilized at 
each session as an objective indicator of the change in clients’ overall distress and 
dysfunction.  A randomized half of clinicians received feedback results from the outcome 
questionnaire, while the other half of clinicians did not receive feedback.  It was 
anticipated that clinicians who received weekly feedback would make more accurate 
judgments regarding client progress than those who did not receive feedback.  Additional 
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research questions included the effects of feedback on confidence, the effects of feedback 
on client progress, and the relationship between the accuracy of judgments made by a 
clinician and client outcomes.   
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Clinical Judgment and Decision Making 
 From the moment of first contact with a new client to the conclusion of service 
provision, clinicians must weigh information in order to make decisions that will benefit 
the client.  The ability of clinicians to make accurate and useful decisions is important to 
all clinical practice; indeed, it is the assumed ability of mental health professionals to 
make more valid decisions than untrained individuals that allows them to charge for their 
services.  The validity of clinical decision making is dependent upon the clinical 
judgment of the clinician.  Given its ubiquitous role in service provision, clinical 
judgment has been described as the foundation of psychological practice (Gambrill, 2005; 
Ridley & Shaw-Ridley, 2009).  Clinical judgment is also among the most widely-
researched topics in applied psychology.  However, it is notable that judgment research in 
psychology is less advanced than similar research in other fields (e.g., medicine; Garb, 
1998). 
Defining Clinical Judgment 
 Clinical judgment and decision making are closely related, given that the applied 
product of clinical judgment is a decision.  Research on both judgments and decisions is 
therefore generally referred to as judgment research.  Clinical judgment is a process of 
critical thinking that is utilized to integrate all available data in order to make a valid 
decision.  The term clinical judgment originated from early work comparing the 
judgments made by clinicians to decisions reached through the application of statistical, 
or actuarial, methods.  Clinical judgment therefore refers to a process of data aggregation 
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that is informal and unstructured, as compared to more formal statistical methods (Meehl, 
1954; Westen & Weinberger, 2004).  Grove and Meehl (1996) described clinical 
judgment as relying “on human judgment that is based on informal contemplation and, 
sometimes, discussion with others” (p.  293).  Clinical judgments therefore involve 
idiographic, multidimensional conceptualizations of an individual, rather than nomothetic 
or probabilistic generalizations (Bell & Mellor, 2009).  Clinical judgment therefore 
incorporates sources of data such as relevant research evidence, clinicians’ clinical 
experience, and various types of information about the client for whom a decision is to be 
made.  A parallel term is clinical prediction, which refers to the application of clinical 
judgment to predict future or concurrent outcomes. 
 Clinical judgment also refers, more generally, to the judgments, inferences, 
observations, and practices of clinicians (Westen & Weinberger, 2004).  Clinicians make 
decisions in varied contexts across all forms of clinical practice.  The initial decision 
made in most therapeutic settings is the assignment of a clinical diagnosis.  Decisions are 
also made early in therapy in order to determine whether treatment is needed, and if so, 
what kind of treatment may be beneficial.  The treatment planning phase of therapy also 
requires several decisions, such as forming a case conceptualization, identifying 
appropriate goals for therapy, and selecting optimal interventions.  Throughout the course 
of therapy, clinicians must make ongoing determinations regarding client progress and 
outcome.  These evaluations are essential in order to decide whether to alter the treatment 
plan, or in the case of progress, whether to terminate therapy. 
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Judgment of Client Progress 
Despite the importance of accurate clinical decisions throughout therapy, most 
clinical judgment research in psychology has focused on the accuracy of diagnostic 
assessments (Hatfield, 2007).  The focus of clinical judgment in the current research is 
judgment regarding client change during the course of therapy.  Evaluating client 
progress from week to week is essential to significant decisions.  For example, the 
judgment that a client has not progressed or has deteriorated might lead a clinician to 
alter the treatment plan by shifting intervention strategies, recommending medication, or 
consulting.  On the other hand, judgment that a client has improved is necessary in order 
to initiate the process of termination.  In addition, judgment regarding client change from 
one week to another is important in evaluating the impact of specific interventions for a 
particular client.  Monitoring of client progress throughout the course of therapy is 
especially important given that an estimated 5% to 10% of psychotherapy clients finish 
therapy in worse condition than when they began (Lambert & Ogles, 2004).  
Additionally, Kendall, Kipnis, and Otto-Salaj (1992) found that even when therapists 
considered clients to be deteriorated, a majority of therapists did not alter their treatment 
plans.   
Several sources of information are available to clinicians in the context of 
evaluating client progress during therapy.  The most ubiquitous data source is clients’ 
own verbal reports regarding their relative change from one week to another.  Additional 
sources of information may include behavioral observations during session, significant 
others’ reports, process measures (e.g., standardized questionnaires assessing constructs 
like alliance or client satisfaction), and outcome measures.   
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It is apparent that various sources of data regarding client change yield different, 
and sometimes contradictory, perspectives on the progress made.  Judgment of client 
progress is therefore highly influenced by the types of information that are available or 
sought by the clinician.  For example, Hole (1972) compared clinician ratings of change 
with change in MMPI-2 results over the course of therapy for 50 depressed patients.  
Results indicated that there was no correlation between profile changes and clinical 
assessment.  However, the study was constrained by methodological problems, including 
the use of one 3-point scale as the clinical rating of change.  Weiss, Rabinowitz, and 
Spiro (1996) reviewed 23 studies which examined the relationship between client and 
therapist estimates of change.  Results were variable, indicating that the relationship 
between client and therapist perspectives is not always strong. 
Hatfield and Ogles (2006) mailed a clinical vignette to 810 practicing 
psychologists and asked them to rate the degree to which various information sources 
influenced their resulting treatment decisions.  Clinicians self-reported that they weighed 
client verbal reports and their own observations of the client much more heavily than 
other data sources.  However, quantitative analyses of responses to systematically 
manipulated variables suggested that client verbal reports and outcome measures had 
equal impacts on decisions.  Negative information from any source was found to 
influence clinicians more than positive information.  Consistently, therapists in other 
studies have rated negative feedback as more valuable than positive feedback (Brodey et 
al., 2005; Haderlie & Kern, 2009). 
In addition to the source of information, judgment of client progress is dependent 
upon characteristics of individual clinicians.  Therapists of different orientations 
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emphasize distinct criteria in evaluating progress.  For example, behavioral therapists are 
likely to seek information regarding symptom frequency and severity as a means of 
evaluating change, whereas dynamic therapists may base judgments on observations of 
clients’ interpersonal behaviors in session.   Kendall and colleagues (1992) found that 
cognitive-behavioral therapists waited until 6 to 8 months of therapy to determine that 
clients were not making progress, but dynamic therapists did not make such a 
determination until 14 months of therapy, on average.  In addition, cognitive-behavioral 
therapists were more likely to report an intention to try different treatment plans for cases 
in which clients were judged to have made no progress or deteriorated.  This latter 
finding was replicated by Hatfield and Ogles (2006). 
 
Evaluating Clinical Judgment 
 The primary criterion used to evaluate clinical judgment is validity (based on 
Chronbach’s, 1971, discussion of the validation of decisions made on the basis of test 
results).  In the context of clinical judgment, it is the validity of a set of judgments made 
by a clinician that is examined.  Decisions are valid if they are reliable, unbiased, 
accurate, and ultimately, useful.  Validity is often difficult to evaluate in judgment 
research because of the need to subjectively select a criterion of accuracy.  For example, 
Garb (1998) noted that psychological diagnoses are difficult to evaluate because they are 
open and arbitrary concepts.  The most common methods of studying the validity of 
diagnoses include the use of structured interviews, expert judgments based on all 
available data (the LEAD procedure; Spitzer, 1983), construct validity studies, latent class 
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analysis, and the Robins and Guze (1970) criteria.  The latter criteria describe a research 
approach to establishing diagnoses as useful entities. 
 These methods have been applied extensively to examine the validity of clinical 
judgments in a variety of contexts.  As noted previously, the value of clinical judgment is 
often evaluated by comparing decisions based on judgment to decisions based on 
actuarial methods.  Results of such studies have consistently favored statistical methods.  
Meehl’s (1954) seminal work summarized findings from 20 studies which compared the 
two methods.  Statistical methods were more accurate in all but 1 study, leading Meehl to 
conclude that clinicians should leave prognosis and classification to statistical methods.  
Although highly controversial (e.g., Holt 1958), Meehl’s conclusions have been generally 
accepted.  Similar conclusions have been reported in subsequent narrative reviews (e.g., 
Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989; Faust, 1989; Grove & Meehl, 1996) and meta-analyses 
(Grove et al., 2000; Ægisdóttir et al., 2006).  Most recently, Ægisdóttir and colleagues 
examined 92 effect sizes in which clinical and statistical methods of prediction were 
compared.  The mean effect size indicated a modest advantage for statistical methods in 
terms of judgment validity (Cohen’s d = .12 to .16, depending upon the stringency of 
inclusion criteria).  Such results underscore the fact that the clinical method of decision 
making is subject to biases which are not common to actuarial technique.  Specific biases 
will be reviewed later.  Attention is now turned to the effect of increased clinical 
experience on the validity of clinical judgments. 
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Experience and the Accuracy of Clinical Judgment 
 One of the most frequently examined variables in the clinical judgment literature 
is therapist experience.  The relationship between experience and clinical judgment is 
also one of the most hotly-debated subfields of judgment research (Spengler, White, 
Ægisdóttir, Maugherman, et al., 2009).  Although some studies have supported the 
hypothesis that increased experience is related to greater judgment accuracy, most 
reviewers of the literature have reached the same conclusion as Wiggins (1973): “There 
is little empirical evidence that justifies the granting of ‘expert’ status to the clinician on 
the basis of his [or her] training, experience, or information-processing ability” (p.  131).  
Howard Garb’s (1998) book, Studying the Clinician, is generally considered the most 
comprehensive review of literature related to clinical judgment and experience (Hatfield 
& Ogles, 2006; Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, Maugherman, et al., 2009).  Garb stated, 
“among the most provocative results reported in the area of clinical judgment are those 
that indicate that presumed-expert clinicians are no more accurate than other clinicians” 
(p.  14), and furthermore that “clinical experience has generally not been related to 
validity, both when experienced clinicians have been compared to inexperienced 
clinicians and when clinicians have been compared to graduate students” (p.  110).  
Similar conclusions have been made so frequently (e.g., Dawes, 1989, 1994; Faust, 1994; 
Faust & Ziskin, 1988; Garb & Boyle, 2003; Wedding & Faust, 1989) that Lichtenberg 
(1997) surmised, “The fact that counselors’ accuracy of clinical judgment does not 
increase with experience is now generally acknowledged” (p.  231). 
 Although the effects of clinical experience on judgment accuracy appear minimal, 
didactic training does appear to increase accuracy.  Aronson and Akmatsu (1981) 
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evaluated the validity of 12 graduate students’ judgments of MMPI profiles across 
several points in time.  Following one year of graduate education in psychology, the 
mean validity coefficient for students’ ratings was .20.  However, the validity coefficient 
increased to .42 following the completion of a course on MMPI interpretation.  The 
students were assessed again following the completion of a one-year assessment and 
therapy practicum; validity coefficients following the practicum were .44, reflecting no 
meaningful increase in validity following practicum experience.  Garb and Boyle (2003) 
reviewed a significant body of literature indicating that both clinicians and graduate 
students outperformed lay judges (e.g., undergraduates, secretaries) on a variety of 
judgment tasks.  However, comparisons between experienced and inexperienced 
clinicians generally reveal no differences in accuracy.  Similarly, comparisons of 
clinicians with graduate students have not typically yielded significant differences 
(except in cases in which graduate students were just beginning their training).  Garb and 
Boyle concluded that clinical judgment increases with didactic training relevant to 
judgment tasks, but that increased clinical experience following training is not 
consistently related to judgment accuracy. 
 Despite the common assertion that clinical experience does not correlate with 
increased validity of judgment, many authors (and clinicians) have been reluctant to 
accept such a conclusion.  At an intuitive level, “It just seems right that clinical 
experience should beneficially affect clinical judgment and decision making” 
(Lichtenberg, 2009, p.  410).  Citing research on implicit learning, Westen and 
Weinberger (2004) suggested that “clinicians would be a very peculiar species indeed if 
they showed no skill development over years of observing and treating psychopathology” 
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(p.  603).  That such beliefs are held by many members of the profession of psychology 
may be inferred by examining the training model for new clinicians, who are required to 
complete a number of hours of practice under the supervision of a more experienced 
clinician before reaching eligibility for licensure.  Similarly, the 2005 Presidential Task 
Force on Evidence-based Practice (Levant, 2005) identified “clinical expertise” as 
essential to identifying relevant research, integrating it with clinical data, considering 
patient characteristics, and providing services that have the highest probability of positive 
outcomes.  The Task Force defined clinical expertise as “competence attained by 
psychologists through education, training, and experience resulting in effective practice” 
(p.  9).  Beutler (1995) referred to the standard training model for psychotherapists as 
reflecting a “germ theory” of education, in that academic training programs “operate on 
the assumption that exposure to psychotherapy, through supervision and class instruction, 
over a finite period of time, will result in competence and expertise” (p.  490). 
 Some researchers have cited related research as potential evidence for positive 
effects of experience on clinical judgment.  Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, Maugherman, 
Anderson, Cook and colleagues (2009) noted that some indirect evidence for the benefit 
of experience has been reported in counseling psychology literature: as compared to 
novice counselors, experienced counselors have been found to differ in cognitive 
dimensions thought to be related to clinical decision making.  For example, experienced 
counselors demonstrated broader knowledge structures, better short- and long-term 
memory for domain-specific information, greater efficiency of time spent on case 
conceptualizations, differing quality of schemata related to case material, and greater 
numbers of concepts generated.  Advantages in such dimensions seem likely to result in 
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improved clinical judgment and decision making.  However, as summarized by the 
various reviewers cited above, empirical studies have often failed to demonstrate such an 
effect.  Garb and Grove (2005) noted that experienced clinicians appear to have some 
advantages in terms of generating hypotheses and structuring tasks. 
Limitations in Experience-Judgment Research 
 Given the intuitive and theoretical reasons to believe that clinical judgment 
improves with experience, many authors have argued that the lack of consistent empirical 
support for such a relationship is a product of methodological deficiencies.  Westen and 
Weinberger (2004) argued that experience in specific domains (e.g., patient populations, 
assessment measures, decision types) increases the validity of decisions in those domains, 
but that general clinical experience confers no advantages for domains in which a 
clinician has limited experience.  However, studies of clinical judgment often require 
clinicians to make judgments regarding novel or analogue tasks with which they do not 
have previous experience.  Holt (1970) noted that research comparing clinical and 
statistical prediction ought to utilize the best clinicians only, given that they would be 
competing with the best statistical formulae.  Similarly, research examining the effects of 
experience on clinical judgment should use only clinicians with significant experience 
relevant to the task demands as part of the “experienced” sample. 
 Another methodological limitation in many studies of clinical experience and 
judgment is a restricted range of experience among raters.  Skovholt, Rønnestad, and 
Jennings (1997) noted that the experience difference between “novice” and “experienced” 
clinicians is often too small, thereby diluting the effects of experience.  This problem has 
similarly been noted in reviews of the effects of experience on outcome.  Stein and 
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Lambert (1984) found that the average experience level in studies of practitioner 
expertise was 2.9 years.  Skovholt and colleagues suggested that 10 to 15 years of 
experience may be necessary to develop expertise.  It is therefore possible that studies 
utilizing samples that are more differentiated in terms of experience may produce greater 
discrepancies between groups in relation to judgment accuracy.  A similar concern is 
inconsistency across studies in operationalizing “experience.” Some researchers have 
utilized levels of training (e.g., master’s versus doctoral students, graduate students 
versus professionals) while others have used continuous measures; even in the case of 
continuous measures, the units of measurement (e.g., years, number of clients seen) have 
varied.  Experience is often measured by single-item measures, which tend to be low in 
reliability (Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, & Maugherman, 2009).  Several other potential 
methodological limitations were identified in the context of a recent meta-analysis, which 
is now described. 
Meta-analysis of Experience and Clinical Judgment 
 Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, Maugherman, and colleagues (2009) noted that 
reviews of the effect of clinician experience on clinical judgment generally take a 
narrative approach, which is subject to impressionistic biases.  Spengler and colleagues 
therefore conducted a meta-analysis in order to examine whether judgments improve with 
experience.  A thorough search strategy revealed 75 studies which provided sufficient 
information to calculate an effect size for clinical or educational experience related to 
clinical judgment accuracy by mental health professionals.  Judgment types represented 
in the analysis included judgments of client problem type or severity, diagnosis, 
recommendations for treatment, and prognosis.  After eliminating outliers, the mean 
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effect size for the relation of experience and the accuracy of judgments was d = 0.12.  
This effect was relatively homogenous in that potential moderator variables (e.g., 
experience type, experience breadth, and study design) were generally non-significant.  
However, the benefit of experience on judgment accuracy was more notable for decisions 
related to diagnosis and treatment recommendations.  Additionally, experienced 
clinicians were better than inexperienced clinicians at decision tasks in which a highly 
valid criterion of accuracy was not available; this may suggest that experience improves 
accuracy when highly nuanced or uncertain decisions are required.   
Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, Maugherman, et al.  (2009) concluded that their 
results indicated a small but reliable effect for the experience-accuracy relationship.  
They suggested that greater clinical or educational experience leads to a 13% increase in 
decision accuracy.  The relatively small effect size found in the meta-analysis suggests 
that the effect of experience on training may be difficult to demonstrate in individual 
studies due to limited power.  Spengler and colleagues calculated that even an atypically 
large study with 200 experienced clinicians and 200 novice clinicians would have a 
power of only .22, assuming an effect size of .12 and an alpha of .05, meaning that results 
would be statistically significant less than one in four times.  Another possibility 
suggested by Spengler and colleagues is that research examining the relationship between 
experience and judgment accuracy may suffer due to contesting mediators.  For example, 
experienced clinicians may be more likely to seek feedback, a potential mediator of a 
positive experience-accuracy relationship, but may also be more likely to engage in 
confirmatory hypothesis testing, which would be negatively related to judgment accuracy.  
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Such complex relationships may be examined by a shift toward path and mediation 
approaches to examining the relationship between experience and accuracy. 
A significant limitation in the studies reviewed by Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, 
Maugherman, et al.  (2009) was that objective feedback was provided to raters in only 
two of the studies.  Therefore, although feedback is frequently suggested to be an 
important means of improving judgment accuracy, it remains understudied.  The 
influence of feedback on the accuracy of clinical judgment is a focus of this paper.  
Feedback is therefore discussed in more detail later.  Attention is now turned to factors 
that influence the decision-making process in clinical judgment tasks. 
 
Factors Affecting Clinical Judgment 
 Several features of human decision-making and cognitive processes have been 
identified as factors which make it difficult for clinicians to learn from experience.  
Dawes (1994) asserted, “there are good logical and empirical reasons why experience 
does not help in this context, even though we may all ‘learn from experience’ in other 
contexts” (p.  106).   The “other contexts” referred to by Dawes include motor tasks such 
as riding a bicycle, driving a car, or even performing surgery.  Such tasks are 
characterized by immediate feedback regarding success or failure.  Additionally, they 
cannot be taught solely through verbal instruction, but rather require repetitive experience 
in order to achieve mastery.  In contrast, clinical judgment tasks do not yield immediate 
physical feedback and involve more cognitive processes.  They are therefore subject to 
cognitive biases and errors.  Some of the most common “cognitive errors” related to 
clinical judgment are reviewed in this section. 
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Anchoring and Adjustment 
 Clinical judgment and subsequent decision-making is heavily influenced by the 
anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic, originally described by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974): “people make estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield 
the final answer” (p.  1128).  Anchoring leads to errors in decision making because 
anchors are often based on insufficient or arbitrary information.  Houts and Galante (1985) 
found that clinicians formed impressions of videotaped clients quickly, and that their 
final decisions regarding client status was influenced by those first impressions.  
Gambrill (2005) noted that clinicians “tend to believe in initial judgments, even when we 
are aware that the knowledge we have access to has been arbitrarily selected” (p.  232). 
 The anchoring heuristic influences decisions at each stage of therapy.  For 
example, clinicians may overvalue information gained during the intake process and 
ignore additional, or even contrary, information revealed during the course of therapy 
(Turk, Salovey, & Prentice, 1988).  It is also likely that anchoring occurs within 
individual sessions.  For example, a client who states early in a therapy session that 
things have been “really good” may be rated by the clinician as improved from the 
previous session even if the client reports increased difficulties during the remainder of 
the hour. 
 Bias resulting from the anchoring heuristic is compounded by the fact that once 
new information is attained, corresponding adjustments are generally insufficient.  Epley 
and Gilovich (2006) found that adjustments away from previous anchors tend to 
terminate once plausible values are reached.  Various studies have found that the order in 
which information is presented influences clinicians’ final ratings, even when all 
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clinicians received identical information by the time they made the ratings (Garb, 1998).  
For example, Pain and Sharpley (1989) presented “good,” “bad,” and “neutral” written 
information about hypothetical clients to clinicians in differing orders and subsequently 
asked them to rate the clients’ global functioning.  They found that when negative 
information was presented first it overshadowed good information presented later. 
Confirmatory Bias 
 A related consideration is the confirmatory bias, the tendency to seek and 
overweigh evidence that supports our beliefs and to ignore and underweigh contradictory 
evidence (Gambrill, 2005).  Confirmatory bias is an error of both memory processes as 
well as behavioral strategies.  For example, after making a diagnosis, a clinician may 
selectively remember information that supports the judgment.  Furthermore, the clinician 
may engage in assessment strategies that are more likely to confirm than to disconfirm 
the original judgment, a tendency known as confirmatory hypothesis testing.  A dramatic 
example of confirmatory bias is Temerlin’s (1968) study.  An actor was commissioned to 
portray on videotape a happy and self-confident with no ostensible signs of 
maladjustment or distress.  In the first condition, raters (psychologists and psychiatrists) 
had access to a senior clinician’s suggestion that the man was a “healthy individual.” 
Raters in this condition uniformly agreed that the man on the tape was, in fact, healthy.  
In a second condition, the senior clinician’s suggestion was that the man appeared 
neurotic but was actually psychotic.  Following viewing of the tape, only 6% of raters in 
the second condition considered that man to be healthy. 
 Strohmer, Shivy, and Chiodo (1990) gave three versions of a case history to 
master’s degree counselors.  One version of the history contained an equal number of 
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phrases describing good self-control and phrases describing a lack of self-control.  The 
other two case histories included either more phrases denoting good self-control or more 
phrases indicating a lack of self-control.  One week later, counselors working with the 
hypothesis that the client lacked self-control remembered more information that was 
consistent with this hypothesis, even when a greater number of contradictory statements 
had been made. 
 Pfeiffer, Whelan, and Martin (2000) examined the hypothesis-testing strategies of 
72 psychology doctoral students.  Participants were given a referral from a physician for 
a mock client who they would later view on videotape in an initial psychotherapy session.  
Referrals provided either a highly-plausible preliminary diagnosis (i.e., one that was 
consistent with content of the videotape), a low-plausibility diagnosis (i.e., largely 
inconsistent with the content of the videotape), or did not include a diagnosis.  After 
reading the referral and viewing the videotape, students reported their preliminary 
hypotheses (diagnoses).  They were then asked to recall nonverbal cues that they had 
attended to during the videotape and to provide 5 questions that they would ask the client 
if they were to continue with the client in psychotherapy.  Participants who had received 
a highly-plausible initial hypothesis (diagnosis) and therapists who formulated their own 
hypotheses independently were more likely than those in the low-plausibility condition to 
utilize confirmatory strategies in their attending to cues as well as their follow-up 
questions. 
 Similarly, Owen (2008) asked 97 mental health counselors-in-training to review a 
hypothetical case study and to report their preliminary diagnostic impressions.  
Counselors were then asked to generate questions they would use in continued 
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assessment of the client.  As hypothesized, counselors generated more confirmatory than 
disconfirmatory questions.  Additionally, questions that were confirmatory tended to have 
more diagnostic clarity and more specificity than disconfirmatory questions, leading 
Owen to suggest that the counselors were better at developing questions that were likely 
to confirm their initial hypotheses.  In the context of judging client progress during the 
course of therapy, it seems likely that clinicians who form the initial impression during a 
session that a client has improved will pursue topics related to client improvement; in 
contrast, the early impression that a client is worse-off may lead the clinician to ask about 
current difficulties in the client’s life.  These strategies would elicit information 
consistent with preliminary hypotheses, which may lead clinicians to gain an inaccurate 
view of client status and progress. 
Hindsight Bias 
 Hindsight bias refers to “the tendency to believe, once the outcome is known, that 
the outcome could have been predicted more easily than is actually the case” (Wedding & 
Faust, 1989, p.  237).  Knowledge of an outcome encourages the view that it was 
inevitable (Gambrill, 2005).  Furthermore, when individuals engage in hindsight bias they 
tend to assume a direct relationship between the observed outcome and events or 
conditions prior to the outcome; explanations of an observed event are often therefore too 
deterministic.  Hindsight bias is similar to confirmatory bias in that it leads to the 
overweighing of information that is consistent with the outcome. 
 Garb (1989) noted that a deterministic outlook can obstruct clinicians from 
learning by experience.  For example, if clinicians construct deterministic explanations 
each time they receive feedback about a client, they will create incomplete explanations 
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given that they do not have all relevant information.  Additionally, feedback may be 
influenced by measurement error, thereby causing clinicians to draw incorrect inferences.  
Dawes (1989, 1994) suggested that although biases in recall make it difficult for 
clinicians to learn from experience, they may also create an illusory correlation in which 
clinicians believe that the quality of their judgments increases with experience.  For 
example, a clinician who notices that many of his depressed clients reported unhappy 
childhood memories may make deterministic assumptions about the influence of unhappy 
childhood events.  He may therefore feel more confident in diagnosing future clients who 
report such events as depressed on the basis of his clinical experience.  However, doing 
so would overlook the fact that many individuals with unpleasant childhood memories 
are not depressed. 
Availability Heuristic 
 Confirmatory and hindsight biases are related to the availability heuristic, which 
occurs when clinicians are influenced by the ease with which instances or occurrences 
can be remembered (Garb, 1998).   The ease of remembering instances varies depending 
upon factors such as retrievability, vividness of the instance, and the strength of 
association between two events.  Tversky and Kahneman (1974) noted that the 
availability heuristic can account for illusory-correlation effects because when the 
cognitive association between two events is strong, one is likely to conclude that the 
events have been frequently paired.  In the example in the previous paragraph, the 
availability of instances in which depression was paired with unhappy childhood 
memories may lead the clinician to perceive an illusory correlation between the two 
events.  Additionally, the clinician is drawing only from an available sample of 
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individuals with depression, which is not representative of all individuals who had 
unhappy childhood experiences. 
Biases Based on Client Characteristics 
 In addition to general cognitive biases, clinicians’ decisions may be influenced by 
characteristics of clients themselves.  Garb (1998) reviewed extant research regarding the 
extent to which clinical judgment is affected but various specific factors, only a few of 
which are summarized here.  Garb concluded that client race was not generally associated 
with treatment decisions or with ratings of psychiatric symptoms and personality traits.  
However, some results suggested that White clinicians may be more prone than Asian 
American clinicians to describe Asian American clients as depressed or withdrawn (Li-
Repac, 1980; Tseng, McDermot, Ogino, & Ebata, 1982).  Garb reported some evidence 
for social class bias related to both personality assessment and treatment decisions.  In 
cases in which bias was found, results most often indicated that lower class clients were 
rated more negatively than middle-class clients.  Regarding treatment, lower class clients 
were less likely to receive psychotherapy than middle-class clients and were judged to be 
less likely to benefit from therapy.  Lower class clients were also more likely to receive 
supportive, rather than insight-oriented, therapy. 
 Lichtenberg (1997) noted that clinicians share some of the same sex-role and sex-
norm biases as society as a whole; such biases are likely to influence clinical decision 
making.  Rosenfield (1982) examined archival data for admissions to a psychiatric 
hospital and found that for individuals diagnosed with personalities and substance-use 
disorders (considered to be associated with being male), 50% of females were 
hospitalized but only 18% of males.  In contrast, among individuals diagnosed with 
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neurosis or depression (more often diagnosed in females), 66% of men and only 43% of 
women were hospitalized.  Referrals for type of therapy may also be influenced by client 
gender.  Two studies (Bowman, 1982; Fernbach, Winstead, & Derlega, 1989) indicated 
that men may be more likely to be recommended for couple therapy and group therapy, 
while women may be more likely to be referred for individual insight-oriented therapy. 
Awareness of Cognitive Processes 
 The application of clinical judgment requires the clinician to carefully examine all 
available information and to assign relative weighting to the various sources in order to 
reach a decision.  This type of complex integration of data, also referred to as configural 
analysis, is difficult to manage.  Faust and Ziskin (1988) suggested that although 
clinicians believe that their decisions rest on a careful weighing of many variables, 
evidence suggests that only a few variables (two or three) make a significant impact in 
such decisions.  Awareness of potential sources of bias and error is therefore an important 
factor in making these complex decisions.  However, research indicates that clinicians 
frequently may be unaware of how they make judgments (Garb, 1998).   
Rock (1994) surveyed 106 mental health professionals (mostly doctoral-level 
psychologists) in order to elicit their attitudes and knowledge regarding clinical judgment 
research.  Although respondents largely agreed that judgment research was important and 
that it had meaningful applications for clinical practice, they reported a low level of 
personal familiarity with judgment literature.  The average respondent had not read any 
of the (then) most significant books or articles on clinical judgment.  It is therefore 
apparent that limited awareness of one’s own internal processes, as well as limited 
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knowledge of cognitive biases in general, may further limit the ability to make complex 
judgments. 
 
Confidence 
 An important factor related to clinical judgment is confidence.  Decisions are 
based in part on the degree to which the decision-maker is confident that a chosen course 
of action will lead to a desired outcome (Stankov, Lee, & Paek, 2009).  A large body of 
research suggests that individuals tend to be overconfident regarding the accuracy of their 
beliefs.  This effect has been noted to have a wide effect in various financial, political, 
legal, and clinical contexts.  Plous (1993) suggested that “no problem in judgment and 
decision making is more prevalent and more potentially catastrophic than overconfidence” 
(p.  217).  Awareness of the limitations of one’s judgments is especially important for 
mental health practitioners, who are called upon to make important decisions in treatment, 
assessment, and forensic settings.  In the context of assessing client progress from week 
to week, a clinician’s overconfidence that a client has improved could lead to the 
premature termination of therapy that would still be beneficial.  It could also deter the 
clinician from pursuing changes to the treatment plan in cases in which the client is 
experiencing little benefit.  Additionally, clinicians who become overconfident fail to 
seek information that would allow them to revise their judgments (Einhorn, 1980).   
Are Clinicians Overconfident? 
 Garb (1986, 1998) reviewed the accuracy (“appropriateness”) of confidence 
ratings made by clinicians in clinical judgment studies.  The majority of studies in this 
area have examined clinicians’ confidence in their diagnoses.  Garb concluded that 
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confidence often (but inconsistently) exhibits a weak positive relationship with the 
validity of judgments.  Although validity and confidence are positively related in general, 
research has demonstrated that clinicians may frequently be overconfident.  For example, 
Gaudette (1992) found neuropsychologists to be accurate on 62% of diagnoses related to 
potential cerebral impairment; neuropsychologists in the study had estimated their hit rate 
to be 77.5%.  Arkes (1981) noted that the most confident clinicians tend to be the least 
accurate.   
It should be noted that a positive overall correlation between confidence and 
validity does not ensure that raters are well calibrated.  A judge is well calibrated if, over 
the long run, for all judgments assigned the same probability of being accurate, the 
proportion accurate is equal to the probability assigned (Lichtenstein & Fischoff, 1977).  
Therefore, if judgments are correct half of the time that a clinician rates his or her 
likelihood of being correct as .5, the clinician is well calibrated.  Calibration, a common 
measure of the appropriateness of confidence ratings, is therefore not strictly a measure 
of the correlation between individual confidence estimates and the accuracy of related 
judgments.   
Experience and Confidence 
 As opposed to the relationship between clinical experience and the validity of 
judgments, the relationship between clinician experience and the appropriateness of 
confidence ratings is generally established to be positive, albeit weakly.  Garb (1986) 
summarized that experienced clinicians tend to make more appropriate confidence ratings 
than inexperienced clinicians as long as the information used to make decisions is valid.  
The relatively increased accuracy of confidence ratings by experienced clinicians has 
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been observed in judgments based on neuropsychological data, biographical data, 
objective personality measure data, and information observed in psychotherapy sessions.  
These findings are interesting given that research in other fields has indicated that experts, 
as compared to non-experts, are as likely or more likely to be overconfident (e.g., 
Lichtenstein & Fischoff, 1977; Mahajan, 1992; McKenzie, Liersch, & Yaniv, 2008).  The 
reasons for the apparent benefit of experience are unclear.  It is possible that clinicians 
gain appreciation for the complexity of decisions with experience.  However, such a 
possibility is somewhat contrary to research regarding the effect of cognitive biases over 
time.   
The Influence of Additional Information on Confidence 
 Oskamp (1965) examined overconfidence in judges consisting of graduate and 
undergraduate students as well as psychologists.  Judges were given a case study and 
asked to answer multiple-choice questions about the case based on the information 
provided.  They also indicated their level of confidence in each answer.  After the first 
round of questions, the judges were provided with additional information regarding the 
case and were administered the same questions, with confidence ratings.  This procedure 
was repeated across four stages.  Oskamp found that clinicians’ confidence increased at 
each stage as they received additional data.  However, accuracy did not significantly 
increase from the first to the last stage.  These results suggest that clinicians may become 
increasingly confident with more information.  It is noteworthy that the additional 
information given at each round was consistent with previous information and added little 
new details. 
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 Trueblood and Binder (1997) provided neuropsychological testing data to a 
sample of neuropsychologists and asked them to make diagnostic judgments.  Some of 
the neuropsychologists were given results from forced-choice tests used to detect 
malingering.  Judges who arrived at a diagnosis of malingering and who received the 
forced-choice test data were significantly more confident in their diagnoses than those 
who diagnosed malingering but without the use of such data. 
 In contrast to Oskamp’s (1965) and Trueblood and Binder’s (1997) results, 
Peterson and Pitz (1986) found that individuals demonstrated less overconfidence in 
decisions as the amount of information available increased.  The decrease in 
overconfidence appeared to occur because as increased amounts of information were 
available, the accuracy of predictions increased while certainty about the precision of 
judgments decreased.  Based on these results, Hatfield (2007) suggested that additional 
information may only increase confidence when it is consistent with previous information.  
Hatfield mailed brief paragraphs about the treatment progress of a hypothetical client to a 
large number of practicing psychologists.  Among the paragraphs, the availability of 
information derived from client verbal reports and from outcome measures was 
systematically varied.  Additionally, the content of verbal reports and outcome measure 
reports was varied to indicate progress or a lack of progress.  After reviewing the 
information, clinicians indicated their treatment recommendations and rated their 
confidence about the accuracy of those decisions.  Hatfield hypothesized that therapists 
who had access to outcome data and client verbal reports that were consistent would be 
more confident than those who had access to only one data source, but that therapists 
would be less confident in their estimations of client progress in cases of contradiction 
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between verbal reports and outcome data.  However, no systematic differences in 
confidence were found among levels of the amount of information available to therapists.  
The effects of the amount of information available on confidence in clinical judgments 
remain unclear. 
 
Improving Clinical Judgment 
 The judgment literature reviewed above indicates that clinical judgment is valid 
and reliable at times but is also vulnerable to a variety of errors due to its subjective and 
informal method of data integration.  Decisions based on clinical judgment have 
generally been less valid than decisions made through the use of statistical algorithms.  
Additionally, clinical judgment appears to improve only marginally with increasing 
clinical experience.  Given these conclusions, various researchers have suggested that it is 
essential to move beyond general examinations of the accuracy of judgment.  Subsequent 
steps in judgment research include identifying conditions under which clinical judgment 
is optimized, developing a comprehensive theory of clinical judgment (e.g., Ridley & 
Shaw-Ridely, 2009), and developing methods of improving clinical judgment.  Garb 
(1998) asserted that “improving the accuracy of judgments is the ultimate goal of 
judgment research” (p.  3).  Although the general effect of training is small, individual 
clinicians appear to vary significantly in the accuracy of their judgments.  For example, 
Haderlie and Kern (2009) found that the correlations between therapists’ estimates of 
client change and an objective change measure varied from -.18 to .31.  It is therefore 
important to consider methods of improving the judgment abilities of individual 
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therapists.  An increasing amount of literature has therefore been devoted to suggesting 
means of increasing judgment accuracy.  Some of these are now reviewed. 
Judgment Task Considerations 
 The accuracy of clinical judgment is dependent upon the nature of the decision to 
be made.  Some decisions, such as the prediction of violence or suicide, are extremely 
difficult (Garb, 1998).  Such tasks may not be appropriate targets for clinical judgment, 
given that standardized decision algorithms tend to be much more accurate.  Garb 
suggested that making ratings for difficult tasks may be not only dangerous, but unethical.  
Gambrill (2005) noted that judgment may at times be more difficult due to situational 
factors such as time pressures, limited resources, and conflicting goals.  Such context 
factors should be attended to and addressed to the extent possible. 
 Another consideration related to judgment tasks is the data sources available.  
Several authors (e.g., Bell & Mellor, 2009; Garb, 1986) have noted that, like any 
assessment procedure, the validity of decisions based on clinical judgment is restricted by 
the reliability and validity of the information obtained.  This observation is supported by 
the fact that results of judgment studies have been significantly more favorable when 
decisions were based on objective, as compared to projective, personality data.  
Furthermore, clinical judgment may vary based on the way in which clinical observations 
are aggregated.  Westen and Weinberger (2004) suggested that clinical judgment may be 
most valid when it is used to rate and code (quantify) various sources of information, 
with these ratings then aggregated through more formal, statistical, procedures. 
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Suggestions for Clinicians 
 Clinicians may improve the validity of their judgments through careful attention 
to elements of a scientist-practitioner approach (Bell & Mellor, 2009; Spengler, White, 
Ægisdóttir, Maugherman, et al., 2009).  For example, clinicians should attend to 
empirical research in order to select validated approaches to assessment and treatment.  
Garb (1998) suggested that when sound empirical research has been conducted, clinicians 
should weight it more heavily than their own clinical experience.  Additionally, various 
authors have noted that clinicians should gain familiarity with literature regarding 
decision-making theories, social cognition, and cognitive biases (e.g., Nisbett & Ross, 
1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
 In addition to increasing their familiarity with relevant literature, clinicians may 
improve their clinical judgment by incorporating debiasing strategies into their decision 
making (Arkes, 1981).  The most frequently-suggested strategy is to consider alternatives 
prior to making a decision.  For example, a clinician who believes a client is depressed 
should consider alternative diagnoses and seek disconfirmatory evidence.  Similarly, 
clinicians should consider client strengths in addition to deficits in order to form a more 
valid view of the client (Garb, 1998).  Specific instruction to consider alternative 
explanations has been found to significantly reduce hindsight bias (Arkes, Faust, 
Gulmette, & Hart, 1988; Tutin, 1993).  Hindsight bias may also be reduced by decreasing 
reliance on memory.  Arkes noted that observations that are not recorded accurately and 
in detail at the time they are made can often be ignored due to hindsight bias.  In other 
words, a clinician’s beliefs influence the information that is remembered unless it is 
documented. 
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Training Considerations 
 The limited effects of experience on the validity of clinical judgments point to the 
essential role played by training in developing clinical judgment abilities.  Didactic 
training may be especially useful in increasing the validity of clinical judgment in 
psychology, given that training effects have been significantly greater than experience 
effects on judgment accuracy.  The suggestions noted above for clinicians may also be 
incorporated into training within graduate programs.  In addition to skills necessary to 
make accurate judgments in certain tasks (e.g., interpretation of an MMPI profile), 
training programs should focus on the development of generalizable skills and attitude 
that will enhance clinical judgment among their graduates.  Although introducing 
students to judgment research is an important component, Arkes (1981) noted that simply 
describing cognitive biases and encouraging individuals not to be influenced by them is 
not effective.  Garb (1998) suggested that graduate programs might increase the accuracy 
of diagnostic decisions by training students to use instruments that are highly valid for 
that purpose, such as semistructured and structured interviews. 
 Spengler, Strohmer, Dixon, and Shivy (1995) developed a scientist-practitioner 
model of psychological assessment that was designed to reduce errors in judgment.  Their 
model involves ongoing observation, inference, and hypothesis testing, which are utilized 
to develop a tentative and fluid conceptualization of the client.  The model also focuses 
on developing scientific attitudes such as openness, self-awareness, and curiosity.  
Competing hypotheses are tested through multiple methods.  Finally, Spengler and 
colleagues’ model provides mnemonics designed to promote debiasing activites.  These 
include the following: 1) consider probability and base rate data, 2) combine actuarial and 
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clinical prediction techniques, 3) delay judgments, 4) reduce overconfidence in one 
interpretation of the data, and 5) invoke a cognitively complex approach to data 
interpretation.  Preliminary evidence suggests that such didactic techniques may increase 
students’ confidence and abilities related to case conceptualizations and assessment 
(Meier, 1999). 
 In addition to increasing judgment accuracy, another potential goal for training 
programs regarding clinical judgment is to reduce overconfidence.  Smith and Agate 
(2004) developed a 90-minute instructional module for trainees in a counseling program.  
Trainees were assigned to treatment and control groups.  Those in the treatment group 
completed the instructional module in small group settings.  The module included a 
hands-on judgment task, group discussion of the process by which decisions were made, 
and didactic instruction regarding cognitive heuristics.  Although all trainees 
demonstrated overconfidence at pretest and posttest, confidence scores were found to 
decrease in the treatment group. 
Decision-making Aids 
 Various aids are available to clinicians in making decisions.  Specific aids depend 
upon the nature of the judgment task.  An important consideration across judgment tasks 
is the consideration of base rates.  Base rate information, such as that applied to statistical 
algorithms, can greatly enhance the validity of judgments.  Arkes (1981) provided an 
instructive example: If the probability of a rare condition (e.g., “multiple personality”) is 
1 out of 100,000 in the general population, the base rate for the condition is .00001.  
Suppose a remarkably accurate test for the condition were available, such that a “positive” 
result for the test occurred 100 times more frequently in individuals with multiple 
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personality disorder than it did among individuals without the condition.  A positive test 
therefore results in a likelihood ratio of 100/1, which would lead most clinicians to 
assume that a positive test almost proves the presence of multiple personality.  However, 
in order to compute the true probability that a positive test is associated with multiple 
personality disorder for an individual in the general population, the likelihood ratio must 
be multiplied by the base rate (100 x .00001), resulting in a probability of only .1% even 
given a positive test result.  The consideration of base rates therefore becomes 
increasingly important when base rates are extreme. 
 Similarly, clinicians should utilize statistical algorithms to the extent available.  
Local norms may be developed in order to establish base rates that are most valid in a 
given setting.  Such activity is exemplary of the local clinical scientist model (Stricker, 
2002).  Clinicians should utilize decision aids such as diagnostic criteria, which improve 
interrater reliability and reduce the effects of bias (Garb, 1998).  The application of many 
statistical decision aids has become more feasible across a variety of settings with 
advances in computers and statistical software. 
Feedback 
 Reviewers of clinical judgment literature have almost universally emphasized the 
importance of feedback regarding decision accuracy.  Meehl (1954) noted that if 
clinicians do not receive feedback about their decisions, the validity of judgment cannot 
be improved.  This sentiment has been repeatedly echoed in more recent literature (e.g., 
Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989; Garb & Boyle, 2003; Lichtenberg, 1997; Spengler, White, 
Ægisdóttir, Maugherman, et al., 2009).  Garb (1998) suggested that “one reason why it 
can be difficult for mental health professionals to learn from their experiences is that they 
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do not receive feedback for some tasks” (p.  201).  Dawes (1994) described a terminal 
insight model to suggest the central nature of feedback to true learning: individuals 
making categorical judgments will utilize a specific sorting rule until they are told that 
they are incorrect.  They then abandon the original rule and try out another, until they 
identify the correct sorting rule and “stick with it.” Dawes noted that “the terminal insight 
explanation implies that subjects will try new ways of sorting by distinguishing 
characteristics only after they receive feedback that they have made an error” (p.  114, 
italics in the original). 
 Despite the central importance afforded feedback in literature regarding the 
enhancement of clinical judgment, feedback in this context has been remarkably 
understudied.   Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, and Maugherman (2009) described the 
results of their literature review using the terms clinical judgment and feedback: “We 
found only a limited number of examples where feedback had been investigated in 
mental health decision making (we found several examples in medical decision making)” 
(p.  419).  Spengler and colleagues concluded that “systematic research is sorely needed 
on methods and types of feedback” (p.  419).  Given that it is a primary focus of the 
current research, the topic of feedback is now described in more detail. 
 
Feedback on Clinical Judgment 
 The study of feedback originated in the fields of cybernetics and engineering and 
was adopted to the study of human behavior in the mid-20th century (Claiborn & 
Goodyear, 2005).  In the context of psychology, feedback is defined as information that is 
provided to a person, from an external source, about that person’s behavior or its effects 
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(Claiborn, Goodyear, & Horner, 2001).  Although feedback is inherent in all human 
interaction, research on feedback has focused on that feedback which is deliberately 
provided with a certain objective, generally to improve performance in the behavior for 
which feedback is provided.  Such deliberate feedback has been termed feedback 
intervention (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996).   Deliberate feedback may be purely descriptive, 
involving a description of behavior with limited inference about implications of the 
behavior (Claiborn & Goodyear, 2005).  However, in the context of enhancing clinical 
judgment, feedback is necessary evaluative.  Evaluative feedback offers an assessment of 
behavior (in this case the decision made) in relation to some criterion (the validity of the 
decision).  Feedback may be indirectly evaluative when it is provided regarding judgment 
tasks.  For example, a clinician may estimate that a client has made progress during the 
course of therapy and then receive feedback indicating that the client has, in fact, 
deteriorated.  In this case, feedback does not directly evaluate the clinician’s judgment 
but nevertheless provides correction because it is compared by the clinician to his or her 
previous judgment. 
 Historically, it was widely assumed that the provision of feedback always results 
in improved performance.  Latham and Locke (1991) noted that “few concepts in 
psychology have been written about more uncritically and incorrectly than that of 
feedback” (p.  224).  However, researchers in the past thirty years have recognized that 
feedback interventions produce variable results.  Kluger and DeNisi (1996) conducted a 
meta-analysis of data from 131 feedback studies, which included 607 effect sizes and 
reflected the data of more than 12,000 participants who received evaluative feedback for 
a variety of tasks.  They found that over one third of the individual effect sizes were 
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negative (i.e., indicated that feedback had resulted in a deterioration of performance).  
Therefore, although the overall effects of feedback were positive and reflected a medium 
effect (d = .41) on performance, individual effects are not uniformly positive. 
 The effectiveness of feedback is strongly influenced by the context and manner in 
which feedback is delivered.  Kluger and DeNisi (1996) found that the effectiveness of 
feedback interventions were augmented by increased frequency of feedback.  Frequent, 
continuous provision of feedback allows the receiver to monitor the value of alterations 
and to continually refine the rules used to make decisions.  Similarly, feedback is most 
effective when it is delivered as quickly as possible in relation to the judgment for which 
feedback is given.  Feedback is also influenced by the validity of the criteria against 
which judgments are compared.  Therefore, it is crucial that measures used to evaluate 
the validity of judgments be sensitive and valid themselves (Gambrill, 2005).   
Effects of Feedback on the Validity of Judgments 
 As noted above, very little research has systematically examined the effects of 
feedback on the validity of clinical judgments.  Goldberg and Rorer (1965, cited in 
Goldberg, 1968) studied the effects of training with feedback on judges’ abilities to make 
valid differential diagnoses between neurosis and psychosis on the basis MMPI profiles.  
Their sample included 3 experienced psychologists, 10 graduate students in psychology, 
and 10 “naïve” participants (non-psychologists with no prior training in the MMPI).  All 
participants engaged in extensive training in which they examined a profile, made a 
diagnosis, and turned the profile over to see the criterion diagnosis.  Over 300 profiles 
were used, multiple times each.  By the conclusion of the training period, judges had 
received feedback for the profiles more than 4,000 times each.  All groups demonstrated 
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increased validity on the training profiles.  However, on testing profiles (those not 
included in the training), Goldberg reported an increase in judgmental accuracy from 52% 
to approximately 58% for naïve judges; psychologists and graduate students 
demonstrated 65% accuracy at the beginning of training and did not experience gains 
following 17 weeks of training.  Training therefore did not generalize beyond the sample 
of training profiles. 
 Graham (1971) conducted one of the only clinical judgment studies in which the 
availability of feedback was systematically varied.  As in Goldberg (1968), the judgment 
task was to identify a Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI; Hathway & 
McKinley, 1943) profile as neurotic or psychotic.  Participants included 21 clinical 
psychologists, 21 graduate students in clinical psychology who had completed 
coursework involving the MMPI, and 21 undergraduate students with no prior MMPI 
experience.  Each participant made diagnoses for profiles in blocks of 10, with neurotic 
and psychotic profiles evenly divided in each block.  Participants in one condition simply 
made diagnoses and received no feedback.  Participants in the other two conditions 
turned profiles over following diagnosis in order to receive feedback; judges in one of the 
conditions received correct feedback, while those in the second feedback condition 
received random feedback (which was accurate only 67% of the time).  Hit rates for PhD 
psychologists were 72% when they received correct feedback, 57% when they received 
random feedback, and 52% (just better than chance!) when receiving no feedback.  
Graduate student hit rates were 61% when receiving correct feedback and 58% in the 
other two conditions.  Finally, undergraduates achieved a hit rate of 57% when receiving 
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correct feedback, 55% with random feedback, and 50% with no feedback.  Receiving 
correct feedback therefore led to increases in judgment accuracy for each group. 
The Nature of Feedback Regarding Client Progress 
 Therapists receive nearly constant feedback regarding their clients’ progress in 
therapy.  Client verbal reports (e.g., “I don’t think what we’re doing is helping me”) and 
behaviors in session provide continuous data which may be integrated by the clinician to 
make judgments regarding client progress.  Westen and Weinberger (2004) suggested 
that “psychotherapists tend to have much more direct and immediate feedback than most 
other medical practitioners, who may prescribe a medication or perform a procedure and 
not see the patient again for a year” (p.  603).  However, feedback such as client verbal 
reports and behavioral observations are highly prone to a variety of biases on the part of 
both the clinician and the client.  Garb and Grove (2005) argued that psychologists 
generally do not receive the same type of highly valid feedback that physicians, for 
example, receive through laboratory tests.  Garb and Grove dismissed the type of verbal 
report feedback described by Westen and Weinberger by suggesting that “astrologists 
weigh the same types of feedback when they decide whether their interpretations are 
correct” (p.  658).  Feedback such as client verbal reports is subject to socially desirable 
responding; many clients are likely hesitant to verbalize feelings that they are not 
progressing for fear of either hurting the therapist’s feelings or personal discomfort 
discussing the topic.  Furthermore, clinicians’ interpretations of client reports may be 
biased due to processes such as confirmatory bias.  Finally, feedback received regarding 
client progress may be misleading due to sampling bias, if clients who are not 
experiencing progress drop out of therapy (Garb, 1998). 
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Outcome Measures as a Source of Feedback 
Due to the limited nature of standard sources of feedback regarding client 
progress in psychotherapy, researchers have increasingly sought to apply more 
standardized methods to the evaluation of client change throughout treatment.  A 
particularly promising development is the use of outcome measures to monitor change at 
frequent intervals throughout therapy, rather than simply as pre- and post-treatment 
assessments.  Although psychotherapists traditionally resisted the use of outcome 
measures in clinical practice (Gilbody, House, & Sheldon, 2002), they are quickly 
becoming more widely used.  Hatfield and Ogles (2004) found that 37% of practitioners 
responding to their survey used outcome measures in some form or another.  This number 
represented an increase as compared to similar surveys only a few years prior, in which 
the proportions of clinicians employing outcome measures were 29% (Phelps, Eisman, & 
Kohout, 1998) and 23% (Bickman et al., 2000).  Outcome measure usage is even more 
common at psychology department training clinics (56%; Tyler, 2002) and internship 
training sites (47%; Mours, Campbell, Gathercoal, & Peterson, 2009), suggesting that the 
proportion of clinicians using such techniques will continue to grow.  The increased use 
of outcome measures in therapy has developed from factors both within the field of 
psychology (e.g., advances in research data and methodologies) and outside of it (e.g., the 
requirements of many agencies and managed health care companies that clinicians 
provide evidence of treatment effectiveness).   
The use of outcome measures as a means of monitoring client change over the 
course of therapy and providing feedback to therapists is one of the most significant 
recent trends in psychotherapy research and practice.  Various systems of outcome 
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measurement have been developed within the last ten years (e.g., Kordy, Hannover, & 
Richard, 2001; Lueger et al., 2001; Miller, Duncan, Sorrell, & Brown, 2005; reviewed in 
Beutler, 2001).  Much of the rapid increase in the usage of such techniques is due to 
evidence that providing clinicians with feedback from outcome measures may result in 
enhanced outcomes for their clients, especially in cases where clients are not progressing 
in treatment.  For example, Brodey, Cuffel, McCulloch, Tani, Maruish, Brody, and 
Unutzer (2005) randomly assigned 1374 clients in a managed behavioral healthcare 
system to feedback or control conditions.  All patients completed 11 items from the 
Symptom Checklist-90 (SCL-90; Derogatis, 1983) at intake and again 6 weeks later.  
Feedback regarding the results was only provided to therapists of patients in the feedback 
condition.  The clients whose clinicians received feedback from their SCL-90 showed 
significantly greater improvement in total symptoms than clients whose clinicians did not 
receive feedback.  Such a result is impressive given the minimal nature of the feedback 
data and the small number of administrations. 
The use of outcome measures as a means of client monitoring and obtaining 
feedback also appears to have benefits in terms of the efficient use of community and 
professional resources.  Slade, McCrone, Kuipers, Leese, Cahill, Parabiaghi, and 
colleagues (2006) administered monthly outcome and alliance measures to therapists and 
clients at a community outpatient clinic in London.  Results of the measures were 
provided to a randomized half of therapists and clients.  Slade and colleagues observed 
that clients in the feedback group averaged significantly fewer days as psychiatric 
inpatients over the course of the study (3.5 as compared to 16.4 in the control group).  
They concluded that the reduced inpatient care usage made the feedback a cost-effective 
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intervention.  Similarly, Percevic (2002; cited in Percevic, Lambert, & Kordy, 2004) 
provided feedback to therapists of a randomly-selected group of clients, while providing 
no feedback on other clients.  Clients in the feedback condition demonstrated reductions 
in their mean length of therapy before discharge at a clinically significant improved 
condition (46 days as compared to 57 days without feedback), suggesting that the 
provision of feedback may have fostered more rapid improvement during the course of 
treatment. 
Although the effectiveness of outcome feedback as a means of enhancing 
outcomes has been well demonstrated, little is known regarding the mechanisms that lead 
to such improvements (Newnham & Page, 2007).  One possibility is that receiving 
actuarial feedback regarding client outcomes may improve clinicians’ judgments about 
treatment effectiveness when clients are not making gains (Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, 
& Maugherman, 2009).  This possibility will be examined in the current research 
utilizing the Outcome Questionnaire-45 (OQ-45; Lambert et al., 2004).  The OQ-45 and 
its associated feedback system, as well as relevant research results, are therefore reviewed 
in more detail. 
  
The Outcome Questionnaire-45 
 The OQ-45 (Lambert et al., 2004) is a 45-item self-report questionnaire that 
measures general psychological distress and dysfunction.  Originally developed in 1996 
(Lambert et al., 1996), the OQ-45 has rapidly increased in popularity among clinicians 
and researchers.  Recent surveys indicate that it is commonly administered at 
approximately 18% of psychology internship sites (Mours, Campbell, Gathercoal, & 
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Peterson, 2009) and 20% of psychology training clinics (Tyler, 2002).  Administration of 
the OQ-45 requires approximately 5 minutes.  Patients rate each of the items (e.g., “I feel 
hopeless about the future”) on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (never true) to 4 
(almost always), in regard to the prior week.  The 45 items yield a Total Score ranging 
from 0 to 180, with higher scores indicating poorer functioning.  The OQ-45 also 
includes three subscales, which are based on Lambert’s (1983) conceptualization of 
psychotherapeutic progress as consisting of three domains of interest: 1) subjective 
discomfort, 2) the quality of interpersonal relationships, and 3) social role performance.  
However, examinations of the factor structure of the OQ-45 have provided limited 
support for a three-factor model (de Jong et al., 2007; Mueller, Lambert, & Burlingame, 
1998).  Umphress, Lambert, Smart, Barlow, and Clouse (1997) found high 
intercorrelations among the subscales, suggesting that they may represent variance of a 
single factor.  A recent examination of the factor structure of an Italian translation of the 
OQ-45 (Lo Coco, Chiappelli, Bensi, Gullo, Prestan, & Lambert, 2008) found support for 
a bi-level solution with one general factor and three second-order factors (representing 
the three OQ-45 subscales). 
Psychometric Properties 
 Test-retest reliability for the OQ-45 is adequate (.84 for the Total Score, .78 to .82 
for the subscales) and decreases with increasing time intervals (Lambert et al., 1996).  
Internal consistency estimates are good, ranging from .90 to .93 for the Total Score 
(Lambert et al., 1996; Vermeersch et al., 2004).  Umphress, Lambert, Smart, Barlow, and 
Clouse (1997) examined the construct and criterion validity of the OQ-45 by comparing 
OQ-45 scores among individuals with various diagnoses.  They found that psychiatric 
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patients scored higher on the Total Score and Symptom Distress scale than did nonpatient 
samples.  Among patient samples, those with Axis I diagnoses received higher scores 
than those with V-code diagnoses, suggesting that higher scores are indeed associated 
with greater distress and dysfunction.  Umphress and colleagues also reported 
correlations between the OQ-45 and a variety of self-report scales (e.g., Beck Depression 
Inventory, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory), with coefficients ranging from 0.53 to 0.86. 
 Because the OQ-45 is often used to monitor client change during therapy, the 
sensitivity of the measure to change is important.  Vermeersch and colleagues 
(Vermeersch, Lambert, & Burlingame, 2000; Vermeersch et al., 2004) have found the 
Total Score and all subscale to be sensitive in reflecting change experienced by clients 
following treatment.  Additionally, 34 of the 45 individual items were found to be 
sensitive to treatment effects. 
Clinical Significance and Reliable Change 
 The clinical cutoff score for the OQ-45 Total Score is 63/64 (Lambert et al., 2004).  
Scores of 63 or below are considered to be in the normative range (reflective of the level 
of distress typically experienced by individuals in the general population), whereas scores 
of 64 or above are classified as being in the clinical range (reflective of a level of distress 
experienced by individuals seeking treatment).  This cutoff score was derived using 
Jacobson and Truax’s (1991) methodology, which is the most commonly used method of 
calculating clinical cutoff scores (Ogles, Lunnen, & Bonesteel, 2001).  Speer and 
Greenbaum (1995) performed a comparative analysis of several existing methods and 
endorsed the Jacobson and Truax approach due to its unambiguous calculation and 
supporting literature base.  The cutoff value, described by Jacobson and Truax as Cutoff 
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C, represents a weighted midpoint between the means of a functional and dysfunctional 
sample.   
 Lambert and colleagues (2004) also applied Jacobson and Truax’s (1991) 
formulae to calculate a reliable change index (RCI) for the OQ-45.  The RCI represents 
the magnitude of change in any direction necessary to be considered reliable (i.e., not due 
to chance variation).  The RCI is a function of the standard error of measurement, such 
that measures of increasing reliability require smaller magnitudes of change in order for 
the change to be classified as reliable.  The RCI for the OQ-45 Total Score is 14.  
Therefore, clients whose Total Score decreases by 14 or more points are considered 
reliably improved, whereas clients demonstrating an increase of 14 points or more are 
classified as reliably worsened or deteriorated.  Clients who begin therapy in the 
dysfunctional range (64 or above), demonstrate reliable improvement, and terminate 
therapy in the functional range (63 or below) are classified as recovered.  Finally, clients 
whose Total Scores do not change in any direction by at least 14 points are classified as 
having made no change.   
 Jacobson and Truax’s (1991) formulae, or similar methods, may be applied to 
determine clinical cutoffs and RCIs for any continuous-scale measure that has sufficient 
normative data.  Distinct measures may therefore produce inconsistent classifications of 
clinical significance.  Beckstead, Hatch, Lambert, Eggett, Goates, and Vermeersch (2003) 
examined the degree to which classifications for clinical significance based on the OQ-45 
were consistent with those based on other common outcome measures (e.g., Symptom 
Checklist-90-R, Derogatis, 1983; Quality of Life Inventory, Frisch, Cornell, Villanueva, 
& Retzlaff, 1992; Client Satisfaction Questionnaire-8, Larson, Attkisson, Hargreaves, & 
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Nguyen, 1979).  The average correspondence among measure classifications of patients 
in the functional or dysfunctional range was found to be 85%.  Similarly, agreement for 
classification of patients as meeting criteria for clinically significant change among the 
measures averaged 65%.  Classification into categories of clinical significance therefore 
appears to be similar across outcome measures, but to vary as a result of the instrument 
utilized.  Beckstead and colleagues noted that the OQ-45 was most similar to the 
Symptom Checklist-90-Revised (Derogatis, 1983). 
Feedback with the OQ-45 
 An innovative feature of the OQ-45 is a supporting software application that 
allows for the provision of rapid and standardized feedback to therapists regarding their 
clients’ scores.  The software, OQ-Analyst (www.oqmeasures.com), provides information 
regarding clients’ current scores, distress level, and the presence of any critical item 
endorsement (e.g., endorsement of suicidal ideation).  Scores are also tracked over time 
in order to monitor client change.  The decision rules and format of the feedback is now 
described further. 
Decision rules.   Two separate sets of decision algorithms have been developed 
for the OQ-45.   The first decision rules were developed based on theory and previous 
research and are therefore termed rationally-derived.   The rationally-derived cutoffs 
(described in Lambert, Whipple, Bishop, et al., 2002) were based on client intake scores, 
the number of sessions completed, and change in the OQ-45 Total Score from intake.  
Later rules were developed statistically using a large normative database (described 
below); they are therefore termed empirically-derived.   Three studies (Lambert, Whipple, 
Bishop, et al., 2002; Lutz et al., 2006; Spielmans, Masters, & Lambert, 2006) comparing 
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the two methods have found the empirical method to be superior in terms of overall 
predictive accuracy. 
 The empirical decision rules were developed by Finch, Lambert, and Schaalje 
(2001), utilizing OQ-45 data from over 11,000 clients seen at graduate training clinics, 
counseling centers, employee assistance programs, and managed behavioral health care 
settings.  Each client in the sample had completed a course of therapy with at least two 
administrations of the OQ-45.  The aggregate of OQ-45 scores at each session for the 
entire sample showed a pattern of decelerating recovery curves in which clients made 
rapid initial progress which then became more gradual.  Finch and colleagues then 
divided the sample into 50 distinct groups based on intake score.  Each group represented 
approximately 2% of the sample and was composed of at least 220 patients.  Some 
groups represented one discrete score on the OQ-45, whereas groups at the extremes of 
the scoring range included patients with a range of intake scores.  For each group, 
hierarchical linear modeling was used to generate expected recovery curves which 
indicate the mean OQ-45 Total Score at each session (1 through 20) for the 
corresponding group in the sample. 
 Following the development of the expected recovery curves, Finch and colleagues 
(2001) derived tolerance intervals around each curve based on the expected mean OQ-45 
score at each session.  For example, a two-tailed 80% confidence interval around the 
mean expected score allowed for identification of the 10% percent of clients that were 
making the least progress, and therefore might be expected to deteriorate or drop out of 
therapy (based on estimates that approximately 10% of patients become worse during 
treatment, Lambert & Ogles, 2004).  Similarly, a two-tailed 68% tolerance interval was 
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calculated for each expected mean by session number.  This provided a cutoff for patients 
whose rate of change was at least 1 standard deviation above or below the mean.   
Alert status.   The cutoffs described above form the basis for categorizations of 
alert status on the OQ-45 feedback.  When a client’s Total Score at a session falls above 
the 80% tolerance interval, the alert status of the resulting feedback is “Red,” indicating 
that progress is significantly less positive than expected.  Similarly, scores falling above 
the 68% tolerance interval (but below 80%) result in “Yellow” feedback.  Scores in the 
middle 68% of scores result in “Green” feedback and scores below the 68% cutoff result 
in “White” feedback.  The OQ-Analyst also generates written messages which 
accompany the alert status.  Sample messages include the following: 
White feedback—‘The client is functioning in the normal range.  Consider  
termination.’ 
Green feedback—‘The rate of change the client is making is in the adequate range.  
No change in the treatment plan is recommended.’ 
Yellow feedback—‘The rate of change the client is making is less than adequate.  
Recommendations: consider altering the treatment plan by intensifying treatment, 
shifting intervention strategies and monitoring progress especially carefully.  This 
client may end up with no significant benefit from therapy.’ 
Red feedback—‘The client is not making the expected level of progress.  The 
chances are that he/she may drop out of treatment prematurely or have a negative 
treatment outcome.  Steps should be taken to carefully review this case and decide 
upon a new course of action such as referral for medication or intensification of 
treatment.  The treatment plan should be reconsidered.  Consideration should also be 
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given to presenting this client at case conference.  The client’s readiness for change 
may need to be re-assessed.’ (Lambert, Whipple, Bishop, et al., 2002, p.  153) 
Accuracy of Prediction 
 Lambert and colleagues (e.g., Hannan et al., 2005; Lambert, 2007) have 
postulated that the accurate prediction of poor outcomes is essential to the effectiveness 
of feedback interventions with the OQ-45.  Clients who receive yellow or red feedback at 
any time during treatment are considered signal-alarms and are predicted to deteriorate 
(operationalized by a demonstrated increase of 14 points or more on the OQ-45 from 
intake to termination).  The accuracy of these predictions has been evaluated in several 
studies (Ellsworth, Lambert, & Johnson, 2006; Lambert, Whipple, Bishop, et al., 2002; 
Lutz et al., 2006; Spielmans, Masters, & Lambert, 2006).  Overall hit rates (the 
percentage of all clients correctly predicted) have ranged from .68 to .83 for the empirical 
decision rules.  The average sensitivity of the OQ-45 in correctly identifying patients who 
deteriorate is approximately .88 (Lambert, 2007).  That is, if 100 patients deteriorate over 
the course of treatment, the OQ-45 will identify 88 of them before termination.  The 
excellent sensitivity of the empirical method comes at the expense of specificity 
(approximately 0.82), as the OQ-45 generates a moderate proportion of “false alarms.” 
Approximately 18% of clients who did not deteriorate were identified as signal-alarm 
cases.  Although such patients did not deteriorate as predicted, they were found in two 
studies to be less likely than the other patients (who were not identified as alarm cases) to 
evidence reliable improvement (Hannan et al., 2005; Lambert, Whipple, Bishop, et al., 
2002).   
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 The validity of predictions made by the empirical decision rules may also be 
evaluated in terms of positive and negative predictive power.  Positive predictive power 
refers to the proportion of patients who receive signal alarm feedback and actually 
deteriorate.  Ellsworth, Lambert, and Johnson (2006) found the positive predictive power 
of the OQ-45 to be .27, a relatively unimpressive proportion due to the number of false 
positives generated by the empirical decision rules.  The negative predictive power, 
referring to the proportion of those predicted not to deteriorate who in fact did not, is 
much higher.  Ellsworth and colleagues found the negative predictive power of the OQ-
45 to be .99.  In other words, patients who do not receive Yellow or Red warnings at any 
point during therapy are very unlikely to have deteriorated at termination.  However, it 
should be noted that these analyses are to be interpreted cautiously due to the use of OQ-
45 data as both predictor and criterion variables.  In other words, false negatives are 
precluded almost by definition; it is unlikely for clients who never produce Red or 
Yellow warnings based on OQ-45 data to be rated as deteriorated by the OQ-45.  The 
degree to which OQ-45 predictions of change correspond with alternative criterion 
measures should be examined. 
 Lambert, Whipple, Bishop, Vermeersch, Gray, and Finch (2002) suggested that 
the large proportion of false alarms generated by the empirical decision rules has 
relatively little real-world cost.  As compared to medical fields, where a false positive 
may result in intrusive procedures (such as surgery or medication), false positives in 
mental health practice are unlikely to create adverse consequences.  A practical cost is 
that therapists may grow weary of frequent warning feedback (Ellsworth, Lambert, & 
Johnson, 2006); therapist frustration with warning feedback may lead them to discount it 
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or to undervalue it.  Feedback is frequently Yellow or Red in alert status; the empirical 
method appears to label 22% to 24% of clients as signal alarms in university counseling 
centers.  In other settings, this number is likely to be higher.  For example, Hawkins and 
colleagues (2004) reported that approximately 50% of clients at a hospital-based 
outpatient clinic were identified as signal-alarm cases. 
 Hannan, Lambert, Harmon, Nielsen, Smart, Shimokawa, and Sutton (2005) 
compared the empirical prediction system to the clinical judgment of 48 therapists 
(graduate student trainees and professionals).  Therapists were asked for three 
consecutive weeks to predict their patients’ final status following treatment (recovered, 
improved but not recovered, no change, or deteriorated) and to rate patients’ 
improvement up to that point in therapy.  Of the 332 clients in the study, 26 were 
deteriorated at termination.  Therapists predicted only 3 patients to deteriorate, 1 of 
whom did deteriorate (as measured by a reliable increase in OQ-45 score).  In contrast, 
the empirical method based on OQ-45 results produced warnings for 55 patients, 20 of 
whom did in fact deteriorate.  Based on the results, it appears that overall hit rates 
between therapists and statistical prediction may have been similar (due to the number of 
false alarms generated by the empirical method), but the statistical predictive method was 
much more likely to identify early in the course of treatment those patients at risk for no 
benefit from treatment.  It bears noting that final outcome in the Hannan et al.  study was 
measured by the OQ-45, increasing the probability that those patients with unusually high 
OQ-45 scores at some point in therapy would be rated by the same instrument as 
deteriorated at termination.  The statistical prediction technique therefore had an inherent 
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advantage as compared to clinicians.  The results would be more convincing had a 
concurrent outcome criterion been used. 
Effects of OQ-45 Feedback 
 Lambert (2007) reviewed five studies (Harmon et al., 2007; Hawkins et al., 2004; 
Lambert et al., 2001; Lambert, Whipple, Vermeersch, et al., 2002; Whipple et al., 2003) 
regarding the effects of OQ-45 feedback on client outcomes.  The five studies shared 
many features: a) clients were seen in routine care and received a variety of clinical 
diagnoses; b) clients were randomly assigned to feedback or treatment-as-usual 
conditions (with the exception of Whipple et al., 2003); c) therapists provided treatment 
from a variety of theoretical orientations; d) postgraduate psychologists and graduate-
students each represented about 50% of study therapists; e) therapists in each study saw 
patients in both the feedback and treatment-as-usual conditions; f) the OQ-45 was used as 
the outcome measure, and decision rules for identifying signal alarm cases remained 
constant; g) the length of therapy was determined by client and therapist without external 
constraints; and h) patient demographic characteristics were similar (with the exception 
of Hawkins et al, 2004, which was conducted in a hospital-based clinic). 
 Each of the five studies addressed the following main question: does feedback to 
therapists regarding client progress improve outcomes? The findings across studies are 
summarized below. 
Effects of feedback on outcome.   Each of the studies reviewed by Lambert 
(2007) found that, among “signal alarm” clients (i.e., clients receiving Yellow or Red 
feedback at some point during the course of therapy), those whose therapists received 
OQ-45 feedback achieved greater improvement than clients whose therapists did not.  
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This finding appears to be robust and has been well replicated, with effect sizes ranging 
from 0.34 to 0.92 (Lambert, 2007).  Lambert noted that such effect sizes compare 
favorably to an average effect size of .20 in treatment outcome studies (Lambert & Ogles, 
2004).   Combined data across studies also demonstrated differences in regards to final 
treatment classification (based on Jacobson and Truax, 1991, criteria for clinically 
significant and reliable change).  Lambert reported that 20% of alarm clients in no-
feedback conditions were rated as deteriorated at termination, whereas the percentage of 
deterioration for clients whose therapists received feedback ranged from 8% to 15%.  The 
percentage of clients classified as reliably improved was higher for alarm patients in the 
feedback conditions than for patients in treatment-as-usual conditions.  These data 
provide evidence for the clinical utility of feedback, in addition to statistical significance. 
Whereas all five studies demonstrated improved outcomes for signal-alarm 
clients, results were less conclusive across all clients.  Indeed, only two studies (Harmon 
et al., 2007; Hawkins et al., 2004) found significant differences between the feedback and 
no-feedback groups when including on-track clients in the analyses.  Lambert (2007) 
noted that “it appeared to make little difference in outcome for feedback (green or white 
messages) to have been given [to clients who progressed as expected in therapy]” (p.  
10). 
Effects of feedback on attendance.    Examination of the effects of feedback on 
client attendance rates is important in order to evaluate whether feedback results in 
improvements in the cost-effective provision of services.  Findings regarding attendance 
have been inconsistent.  Three studies (Harmon et al., 2007; Lambert et al., 2001; 
Lambert, Whipple, Vermeersch, et al., 2002) found an increased average number of 
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sessions for alarm clients in feedback conditions, whereas no such difference was found 
in the other studies.  Observing this discrepancy, Harmon and colleagues stated, “it seems 
fair to conclude that the positive effects of feedback can be obtained with and without 
extending treatment length” (p.  390).  Findings have also been mixed regarding 
attendance rates among on-track clients.  Lambert (2007) reported that feedback 
decreased sessions by an average of 0.66 sessions in about half the studies.  It is 
interesting to note that in the two studies (Harmon et al., 2007; Hawkins et al., 2004) that 
found improved outcomes for on-track groups, on-track clients who received feedback 
did not differ from their no-feedback counterparts in number of sessions attended.  In 
conjunction with the finding (in Lambert et al., 2001, and Whipple et al., 2003) that on-
track clients in the feedback conditions achieved equivalent results to their counterparts 
in fewer average sessions, the results suggest that clients deemed as on-track may 
improve at a slightly faster rate when therapists receive feedback. 
Effects of feedback on clinical judgment.   Haderlie (2009) examined the 
validity of 5 novice psychotherapists’ judgments of client change over the course of 5 
months of practicum experience during which therapists received weekly feedback from 
their clients’ OQ-45 results.  Following each session, but before receiving feedback, 
therapists estimated their clients’ change from the previous session to the current session 
using a 7-point Likert-type scale.  In order to evaluate change in judgment accuracy over 
time, the first and last 5 sessions of each therapist were examined as blocks.  The mean 
correlation between individual therapists’ estimates of client change from the previous 
session and change over the same period as indicated by the OQ-45 was .06 for the first 
block, reflecting virtually no validity of judgment.  By the last block, the mean 
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correlation had increased to .56, a significant difference from the first block.  The 
therapists therefore increased dramatically in their abilities to estimate client progress.  
However, the degree to which receiving feedback contributed to the observed gains 
cannot be known due to the uncontrolled nature of the design.  However, given the 
consistent finding that clinical experience is at best weakly related to the validity of 
judgments, it seems likely that the feedback contributed significantly to the increased 
judgment accuracy. 
 
Present Study 
 The primary purpose of the present research was to examine whether providing 
clinicians with feedback regarding client progress lead to increased accuracy of 
judgments regarding client progress.  Specifically, therapists were asked to rate client 
progress immediately following each session.  Client progress was rated in terms of 
change from the beginning of treatment as well as change from the previous session.  
Because the judgments were made on the basis of information and observations gained 
directly from sessions with the clients, therapists’ judgments were a naturalistic reflection 
of the judgment of client change in psychotherapy.  Clinical judgments of change were 
compared to changes on the OQ-45, a self-report measure of distress and dysfunction.  
The effect of feedback on clinicians’ confidence in their clinical judgments regarding 
client progress was also examined.  Therapists were randomly assigned to either receive 
feedback following each judgment or to receive no feedback.  The current research 
therefore contributes to the clinical judgment literature by systematically examining the 
effects of feedback on the accuracy of clinical judgment.  Although it has been widely 
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suggested that feedback is essential to improving the accuracy of judgment, very little 
research has examined this possibility. 
 The primary hypothesis examined in the present research concerned the effect of 
OQ-45 feedback on the validity of clinical judgment.   
 Hypothesis I: Clinicians who received OQ-45 feedback would demonstrate 
greater increases in judgment accuracy than clinicians who did not receive 
feedback. 
 Feedback is widely believed to be an important, and possibly necessary, means of 
enhancing clinical judgment.  Additionally, some limited research has supported the 
positive effects of feedback on judgment accuracy (e.g., Goldberg, 1968; Graham, 1971).  
It was therefore expected that clinicians who received feedback would demonstrate more 
accurate judgments of client change at the conclusion of data collection than clinicians 
who did not receive feedback.  In statistical terms, a group (feedback, no-feedback) by 
time (beginning, end of data collection) interaction was expected in which the rate of 
improvement in judgment accuracy would be more steeply positive for clinicians who 
received feedback.  The effect was expected to be observed both for judgments of 
progress since the beginning of treatment and judgments of progress since the previous 
session.   
Hypothesis II: Clinicians who received OQ-45 feedback would demonstrate 
greater increases in confidence regarding their judgments as compared to 
clinicians who did not receive feedback.   
 The second hypothesis concerned the effects of feedback on clinicians’ 
confidence in their judgments.  Although the provision of additional information does not 
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universally lead to increased confidence in judgments, it has been found to in some 
studies (e.g., Oskamp, 1965; Trueblood & Binder, 1997).  It was expected that in the 
current study, receiving OQ-45 feedback for each session would result in increased 
confidence in the accuracy of judgments regarding client progress. 
 Hypothesis III: Clinicians who received OQ-45 feedback would demonstrate 
greater calibration of confidence ratings than clinicians who did not receive 
feedback. 
 In addition to examining the absolute value of clinician confidence ratings, the 
effects of feedback on the appropriateness of confidence ratings were of interest.  The 
appropriateness of confidence ratings is most commonly evaluated by calculating each 
judge’s calibration, which is equivalent to the absolute difference between the mean of 
confidence ratings and the overall proportion of correct decisions.  Perfect calibration is 
reflected by a score of 0.0, whereas values moving away from 0.0 reflect poorer 
calibration.  Although the effects of feedback on the appropriateness of clinicians’ 
confidence ratings have received little examination, research on the confidence-accuracy 
relationship in eyewitness testimony has suggested that the accuracy of confidence may 
improve with feedback (Kassin, 1985; Perfect, Hollins, & Hunt, 2000).  It was therefore 
hypothesized that clinicians who received feedback would demonstrate greater 
calibration than those who did not. 
 In addition to the hypotheses outlined above, several research questions received 
preliminary examination.  One of these related to individual differences among therapists.  
Psychotherapy outcome research has indicated significant variability among individual 
clinicians in outcomes (e.g., Okiishi et al., 2006) and indicated that individual differences 
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among therapists account for 5% to 9% of the variance in outcomes (Crits-Cristoph et al., 
1991).  Spengler, White, Ægisdöttir, Maugherman, and colleagues (2009) noted that the 
degree of individual differences in judgment accuracy among therapists has not been 
examined.  Additionally, it was unknown whether the accuracy of individual clinicians’ 
judgment is related to the outcomes experienced by their clients.  Given the primary 
importance of clinical judgment across the course of psychotherapy, it is possible that 
judgment accuracy will be related to client outcomes.  “Outcome” data was unavailable 
for some clients in the present research given that the period of data collection did not 
always include their first or last sessions.  This question was therefore examined in terms 
of the rate of change observed over the course of data collection. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHOD 
Participants 
 Participants in the study included therapists at the Center for Individual, Couple, 
and Family Counseling (CICFC) and the student Counseling and Psychological Services 
(CAPS), both at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas.  All therapists at CAPS and all 
psychology trainees at CICFC were invited to participate.  Participating therapists were 
given the option of providing an email address in order to be entered in a drawing for one 
of two $25 gift cards to a bookstore.  An original total of 15 therapists consented to 
participate in the study.  In order to maximize confidentiality given the collegial 
relationship of the current researcher with many of the participants, demographic 
information was collected separately from all other data.  Consenting therapists had a 
mean age of 32.6 years (SD = 11.2) and were predominantly female (66.7%). Regarding 
ethnicity, 60 percent of the sample was Caucasian.  Other reported ethnic identities 
included Hispanic (n = 2), Asian-American, Pacific Islander, Indian, and mixed. 
Following recruitment, 4 therapists did not subsequently provide enough data for 
inclusion.  Another therapist’s data was not included because procedural errors had 
resulted in inconsistent provision of feedback.  The resulting sample for data analyses 
included 10 therapists, with 5 in both conditions.  Therapists in the final sample had been 
practicing psychotherapy for an average of 10.70 months (SD = 17.85). This figure was 
positively skewed, in that all therapists but one reported less than 12 months of clinical 
experience.  Although the professional therapist in the sample had significantly more 
clinical experience than other participants, data from this therapist was consistent with 
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other data.  Additionally, the exclusion of this therapist did not alter the observed trends 
in the data.  The therapist was therefore included in analyses in order to maximize data.  
Two therapists reported having earned doctorate degrees, two held master’s degrees, and 
six reported that their highest degree was a bachelor’s degree. Participating therapists 
were predominantly doctoral students in a clinical psychology program; one therapist 
reported a counseling psychology background. Each therapist reported data for multiple 
sessions (M = 36.1, SD = 22.7, Range = 11 to 77) with multiple clients (M = 5.4, SD = 
2.2, Range = 3 to 9).   All therapists had some prior clinical experience with the OQ-45; 
only one reported having previously received formal feedback.  
 
Measures 
OQ-45 and Feedback 
 Client progress was measured with the Outcome Questionnaire-45 (OQ-45; 
Lambert et al., 2004). The OQ-45 is a 45-item self-report measure of general distress and 
dysfunction. Total scores for the 45-item measure range from 0 to 180, with higher scores 
indicative of greater distress. As reviewed above, strong evidence has been compiled for 
both the reliability and validity of the OQ-45. Additionally, the OQ-45 total score as well 
as the majority of individual items are sensitive to client change over time. The measure 
generates three subscale scores (Symptom Distress, Interpersonal Relations, and Social 
Role). However, only the total score was used for data analyses in the current research 
due to limited support for the OQ-45 subscales. Feedback reports to therapists were 
generated based on clients’ OQ-45 results utilizing the OQ-Analyst software. Feedback 
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was based on the empirical decision rules developed by Finch et al. (2001), as described 
above. 
Therapist Registration Form 
 Information regarding therapist experience was collected at the beginning of data 
collection through a Therapist Registration Form (see Appendix). Therapists were asked 
to provide a 4-digit code number for use throughout data collection. Reviewers of clinical 
judgment literature (e.g., Spengler, White, Ægisdöttir, Maugherman, et al., 2009) have 
noted that studies are often limited by unreliable measurement of clinical experience. 
Spengler and colleagues suggested that “experience might be best measured using 
multiple items as well as with proximal and distal measures” (p. 422). The Therapist 
Registration Form therefore includes both categorical and continuous measures of 
experience, including the highest degree completed, field of practice, and the number of 
months for which a clinician has practiced psychotherapy. Additionally, whether 
clinicians have previously used the OQ-45, whether they received feedback, and for how 
long was assessed.  
Therapist Estimate of Change 
 Therapists’ judgments regarding client change were ascertained using a Therapist 
Estimate of Change form (see Appendix). Estimates of change from the previous session 
to the current session and from the beginning of treatment to the current session were 
made on separate one-item Likert-type rating scales. Each scale consists of 7 points (1 
through 7). Therapists estimated the direction and the amount of change made by clients 
from the previous point of reference. The three points on the right side of both scales are 
labeled much improved, somewhat improved, and slightly improved. The three points on 
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the left are equivalent except that worse is substituted for improved. The midpoints are 
labeled no change. Likert-type scales generally demonstrate adequate reliability; the 
validity of Likert scales has not been evaluated as extensively (Chang, 1994). The scales 
were designed to include a mid-point because it was necessary to include a point 
reflecting no change in either direction. There is no general consensus regarding the 
optimal number of scale points; some investigators (e.g., Brown, Widing, & Coulter, 
1991; Matell & Jacoby, 1971) have found the reliability of items to be independent of the 
number of points. Others have noted that reliability increases with the variability of a 
scale; however, too many scale points may lead to method variance by invoking extreme 
response sets (Chang, 1994). Given that several authors have advocated 7-point scales as 
the most reliable (e.g., Cicchetti, Showalter, & Tyrer, 1985; Ramsay, 1973), 7 points 
were used for the Therapist Estimate of Change items. Although single-item measures 
have been criticized as low in reliability (Schmidt & Hunter, 1996), some researchers 
have found such measures to demonstrate adequate internal consistency (.66) and test-
retest reliability (.82; Matell & Jacoby, 1971). Single-item measures were utilized in the 
present study due to the necessity of creating a brief measure of therapist change 
estimates that could be completed following each session. Additionally, it is likely that 
therapists make global judgments regarding client progress; a single-item estimate of 
change was therefore expected to adequately reflect clinical judgment of progress. 
 Therapists’ level of confidence in both estimates was also ascertained through the 
Therapist Estimate of Change form. Therapists were instructed to base their confidence 
ratings solely on the direction of change without considering the magnitude of change. 
Focusing on the direction of change allowed estimates to be converted into a categorical 
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variable with three levels (improved, no change, worsened) that was subsequently 
utilized to examine the appropriateness of confidence ratings. Therapists indicate their 
level of confidence in each judgment from .30 (the rounded probability of being correct 
by chance) to 1.00, in increments of .10. The resulting data was used to calculate 
calibration for each judge. 
 
Procedure 
 Therapists who opted to participate were oriented to the study and signed 
informed consent prior to beginning data collection. Clients at the CICFC are routinely 
administered the OQ-45 at each session for program evaluation and clinical training 
purposes and therefore experienced no variation from standard procedures. Thus, clients 
of participating therapists at CICFC who had consented to the use of archival research 
data were included without study-specific consent procedures.  A majority of clients at 
CICFC were ongoing therapy clients who had met with therapists for multiple sessions 
prior to the beginning of data collection; baseline data regarding symptom severity was 
therefore unavailable.  At CAPS, clients of participating therapists were invited by those 
therapists to participate at the time of their first sessions.  Therapists provided an 
informed consent document describing the general research purposes and informing 
clients of study procedures, which included completing an OQ-45 upon arrival to the 
waiting room prior to each session.  Participating clients self-identified as study 
participants upon checking in and OQ-45’s were provided by CAPS front desk staff.  
Given that therapists were the primary subjects of interest, no client demographic 
information was collected at either clinic.  Data were collected from a total of 47 clients 
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(38 at CICFC and 9 at CAPS). Individual clients provided data for multiple sessions, 
ranging from 1 to 22.   
 Participating therapists completed a registration form at the beginning of data 
collection in which each therapist provided a 4-digit code number that was used 
throughout the research. Therapist identities were therefore unknown to researchers at all 
stages of the research and study data is anonymous. The registration form also elicited 
basic information regarding therapists’ training and clinical experience, as well as 
information regarding any previous experience with feedback from the OQ-45.  
Therapists completed two separate pages including a demographics form which was not 
associated with therapist code numbers, and an optional form in which they provided 
email addresses for consideration in a drawing for one of two gift cards.  These forms 
were stored separately from therapist registration forms. 
 Following registration, each therapist was randomly assigned to either a Feedback 
(FB) or a No-Feedback (NFB) condition. Block random assignment was utilized to 
ensure equal sample sizes in the FB and NFB conditions and therefore preserve statistical 
power, which was important given the small number of therapists available for 
participation in the study. 
 Data collection occurred from March 2010 to January 2011.  During the data 
collection phase, clinic staff administered the OQ-45 to clients as they arrived for therapy 
sessions. The measure takes approximately five minutes to complete on average, 
although administration may range from three minutes to 15 minutes in rare 
circumstances (Lambert et al., 2004). After clients completed the OQ-45, the 
questionnaires were set aside for researchers rather than delivered directly to clinicians. 
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Immediately following each session, therapists completed a brief Therapist Estimate of 
Change form in which they estimated client change from the previous to the current 
session and indicated their confidence in the accuracy of their estimation. The Therapist 
Estimate of Change and OQ-45 forms were collected by researchers twice weekly for 
data collection. The OQ-45 forms were scored and paper feedback reports were generated 
using OQ-Analyst software (www.OQmeasures.com). OQ-45 forms and associated 
feedback reports were delivered to therapists in the FB condition within two days of each 
session in order to allow them to review the reports prior to their next session with the 
client. Thus, feedback was essentially delayed one session: feedback reports received by 
therapists reflected client change over the time period from two sessions previous to the 
most recent session. Additionally, therapists’ estimates of client progress were made 
following sessions, whereas client OQ-45 data was obtained prior to the session.  This 
schedule was necessary in order to elicit therapist estimates of change before providing 
feedback. The schedule was also consistent with those of previous research studies that 
demonstrated beneficial effects of OQ-45 feedback (e.g., Harmon et al., 2007). OQ-45 
forms for therapists in the NFB condition were stored securely by researchers until the 
conclusion of data collection and then returned to client files.  
 
Data Analyses 
 In order to examine changes in criterion variables (e.g. accuracy of judgments, 
confidence ratings, calibration) from the beginning of data collection to the conclusion of 
data collection, it was necessary to identify a baseline and final group of judgments for 
each therapist. This was complicated by the variability in the number of judgments made 
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by each therapist during data collection. The first 5 judgments made overall by each 
therapist were therefore considered baseline performance (i.e., criterion variables were 
calculated using only those sessions). Similarly, the last 5 judgments made by each 
therapist were utilized to calculate outcome performance. A 5-session cutoff was utilized 
in the current study because it was considered to be a minimum number of sessions in 
order to produce reliable estimates, and allowed for the inclusion of the maximum 
number of therapists possible (e.g., a cutoff of 10 sessions would have necessitated the 
exclusion of 4 additional therapists).  The baseline and outcome blocks therefore 
represented the first and last 5 judgments made by the therapist during the course of data 
collection; these 5 sessions included multiple sessions with the same client in some cases. 
Given the differences in the number of judgments and subsequent feedback 
administrations per therapist, the correlation between total number of sessions completed 
and each criterion variable was examined; where this correlation was significant, the 
number of sessions completed was utilized as a covariate for analyses.  
 The accuracy of therapists’ judgments of client progress was estimated in two 
manners. The first was to examine the “hit rate” of therapists’ judgments of the direction 
of change. A judgment was considered a “hit” if the therapist estimated that client 
progress had been in the same direction indicated by the client’s OQ-45 self-report (i.e., 
comparing the OQ-45 Total score at current session to the Total score at the previous 
session). Reducing estimates to the direction of change allowed for a standard criterion of 
accuracy. 
 The accuracy of judgments was also estimated by calculating the correlation 
between therapists’ estimates of client progress (on a Likert scale from 1 to 7) and client 
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progress as measured by the OQ-45. This correlation was calculated for each therapist 
individually based on all ratings made by the therapist. Although this method of 
operationalizing judgment accuracy does not provide an absolute criterion of accuracy, it 
examines the degree to which therapists had a “feel” for client progress and altered their 
judgments in conjunction with client change. 
 All estimates of judgment accuracy were calculated on the basis of judgments of 
progress since the previous session. This judgment was considered a more difficult and 
more important judgment, given that it typically requires finer-grade distinctions in client 
functioning and status. Additionally, data from each therapist’s first session with each 
client was unavailable, making impossible the examination of accuracy of judgments 
regarding change from the first session. 
 The appropriateness of confidence ratings was computed using Lichtenstein and 
Fischoff’s (1977) formula for calibration, which is equal to the absolute difference 
between the mean of the probability (confidence) responses and the overall proportion 
correct (hit rate). In order to increase the validity of the outcome criterion (i.e., the 
direction of change on the OQ-45), the Standard Error of Measurement (SEM) of the 
OQ-45 was placed around the value 0 on the OQ-45 total score. Change values falling 
within this range were considered to reflect no change. An SEM of 6.57 was estimated 
for the OQ-45 Total Score based on a reported internal consistency coefficient of .93 
(Lambert et al., 1996) and a standard deviation of 24.84 at pre-test in outpatient settings 
(Lambert et al., 2004). Therefore, change scores falling within 3 points of 0 were coded 
as no change.  
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 Because “outcome data” (i.e., estimates of client status at the beginning and end 
of treatment) were not available for each client, the effectiveness of therapy was 
considered by examining the rate of change for each client during the course of data 
collection. A rate of change was calculated for each client by dividing observed change 
on the OQ-45 Total Score from the beginning to the end of data collection by the number 
of sessions attended by the client. Experience variables were not utilized in the analyses, 
given the limited variability of experience among therapists in the current sample. 
 The limited number of therapists available for the current study led to small 
groups (n = 5 for both conditions) and therefore low statistical power.  Given the limited 
power, statistical significance was unlikely for most analyses.  Results are therefore 
considered exploratory and are discussed in terms of observed trends and effect sizes. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Preliminary Analyses 
 In order to evaluate potential pre-existing differences between therapists in the FB 
and NFB conditions, group means were compared utilizing independent-samples t tests. 
For all criterion variables (e.g., judgment accuracy, confidence ratings, calibration), 
preliminary differences were examined by utilizing the first 5 data points for each 
therapist. No significant differences were found for therapist experience, judgment 
accuracy (as measured by hit rate or by correlation), confidence ratings, calibration, or 
the number of sessions completed during data collection. See Table 1 for a summary of 
these preliminary analyses.  There was some notable difference between conditions in the 
initial judgment hit rate, as therapists in the feedback condition demonstrated greater 
accuracy than those in the no-feedback condition.  Additionally, initial calibration was 
better (lower) among therapists in the feedback condition.  The mean number of months 
of clinical experience also differed somewhat between groups, primarily due to the 
inclusion of one professional clinician in the feedback group, whereas all other study 
therapists were practicum students (as reflected in the discrepancy between standard 
deviations for experience means in the FB and NFB conditions). 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean ratings for the Therapist Estimate of Change (TEC) form are reported in 
Table 2.  Means were calculated by therapist first and then combined as grand means in 
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Table 1 
 
Initial Differences between Feedback (FB) and No-Feedback (NFB) Groups 
 
          FB           NFB 
Variable     M   SD     M      SD         Cohen’s d   
Experience (mos.)  17.20 24.23  4.20     4.87  0.74 
Initial Judgment Accuracy   
 Hit ratea  0.50 0.20  0 .25     0.19  1.28 
 Correlationa  0.08 0.59  0.14     0.25  0.13 
Initial Confidence Ratings 
 From firsta  0.83 0.08  0.81     0.09  0.23 
 From prev. a  0.81 0.04  0.83     0.09  0.29 
Initial Calibrationa  0.30 0.23  0.56     0.26  1.06  
Number of sessions  37.40 23.08  34.80    23.08 0.11 
aValue calculated using the first 5 data points for each therapist 
 
order to account for variability in the number of ratings made by each therapist.  On 
average, therapists were slightly more positive than “neutral” in estimating change from 
the previous session.  When considering progress since their first session with a client, 
therapists tended to rate change as “slightly improved” to “somewhat improved” on 
average.  Therapists reported high confidence ratings for their judgments of client 
progress. 
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Table 2 
Mean Scores for Therapist Estimate of Change Across all Therapists 
Item Mean SD Range 
In your judgment, how has your client’s status changed 
since the previous session? 
 
4.65a 0.59 1 to 7 
How confident are you in the accuracy of your judgment 
regarding the direction of change (worse, no change, or 
improved) since the previous session? 
 
80.34 6.70 50 to 100 
In your judgment, how has your client’s status changed 
since your first session with the client? 
 
5.46a 0.60 1 to 7 
How confident are you in the accuracy of your judgment 
regarding the direction of change (worse, no change, or 
improved) since your first session? 
83.58 8.52 50 to 100 
Note. Means (and accompanying standard deviations) reflect the grand mean of 
individual therapist means.   
aResponses based upon a 7-point scale with 1 = much worse, 2 = somewhat worse, 3 = 
slightly worse, 4 = no change, 5 = slightly improved, 6 = somewhat improved, and 7 = 
much improved. 
 
 
 Examination of raw data (without collapsing by therapist) indicated that when 
judging progress since the previous session, therapists rated clients as improved at 44.5 
percent of sessions; clients were rated as having made no change at 39.2 percent of 
sessions and as having deteriorated at 16.2 percent of sessions.  Corresponding OQ-45 
data reflected improvement at 37.2 percent of sessions, no change at 28.5 percent of 
sessions, and deterioration at 34.3 percent of sessions.  For judgments of change since the 
first session, therapists’ estimates were as follows: 79.4 percent improved, 16.8 percent 
no change, and 3.8 percent deteriorated.  Corresponding OQ-45 data were not available 
given that many clients in the study had already been attending sessions before their 
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inclusion in the study and therefore data regarding their initial severity had not been 
obtained. 
 
Judgment Accuracy 
Hit Rate 
 The accuracy of therapist estimates regarding the direction of client change from 
one session to another was estimated by calculating hit rates for each therapist.  The mean 
hit rate across all therapists was 0.36 (SD = 0.14).  On average, therefore, therapists 
performed at approximately chance level when making estimates regarding the direction 
of change (as there were three available response categories: positive change, negative 
change, or no change). Hit rates for individual therapists ranged from 0.20 to 0.64.  
Judgment accuracy as measured by hit rates was unrelated to the number of sessions 
completed by individual therapists, r(8) = .19. 
 The effect of feedback on judgment accuracy was evaluated through examination 
of accuracy as a function of group assignment and time.  The time factor was 
operationalized by comparing hit rates for each therapist’s first and last 5 sessions. 
Although judgment accuracy increased slightly across the course of the study, from a 
total mean hit rate of .38 (SD = .23) to .42 (SD = .13), this did not appear to be a 
meaningful increase (partial eta squared = .05) and it was not significant.  On average, 
judgment accuracy increased among therapists in the no-feedback condition from the first 
5 to the last 5 sessions.  In contrast, judgment accuracy decreased slightly among 
therapists in the feedback condition from the first 5 to the last 5 sessions.  This interaction 
effect was relatively large (partial eta squared = .33) and was contrary to the 
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hypothesized results, in that feedback was found to be detrimental to judgment accuracy.  
See Table 3 for a summary of all between-group comparisons. 
Correlations 
 Judgment accuracy was also evaluated by examining the correlation between 
therapists’ judgments of client change and observed change on the OQ-45 at each 
specific session. The grand mean of individual therapist correlations was -.01 (SD = .41), 
indicating that therapists’ estimates of client change did not tend to covary with change as 
measured by the OQ-45. Correlations for individual therapists varied widely, from -.51 to 
.61. There was a moderate positive relationship between these correlations and the 
number of sessions completed by the therapist, r(8) = .57, indicating that correlations 
tended to improve as therapists completed more sessions. Estimates of judgment accuracy 
based on correlation were not related to estimates of judgment accuracy using the hit rate 
criterion, r(8) = -.03. 
 The correlation between therapists’ estimates of client change from the previous 
session and change as measured by the OQ-45 was utilized as a dependent measure to 
examine the effect of feedback on clinical judgments. A repeated-measures ANCOVA 
was conducted, with feedback condition as a between-groups factor. The number of 
sessions completed by the therapist was utilized as a covariate for the analysis, given the 
relationship between sessions and judgment accuracy as measured by correlation. 
Baseline and outcome periods were operationalized as above.  Mean correlations 
increased somewhat from the first 5 (M = .05) to the last 5 sessions (M = .19); this effect 
was very small (partial eta squared = .01).  Inspection of means revealed that average 
correlations increased in the NFB condition, whereas correlations for therapists who 
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Table 3 
 
Condition by Time Interactions for Outcome Variables 
 
         FB           NFB 
Variable    M   SD     M      SD       partial eta squared     
Judgment Accuracy   
Hit rate 
 First 5  0.50 0.20  0.25     0.19    
 Last 5  0.40 0.00  0.45     0.19   0.33 
Correlation  
First 5  0.08 0.59  0.03     0.10    
 Last 5  0.03 0.60  0.40     0.38   0.19a 
Confidence Ratings 
From first  
First 5  0.83 0.08  0.81     0.09   
 Last 5  0.81 0.12  0.89     0.06   0.60a 
From previous 
First 5  0.81 0.04  0.83     0.09    
 Last 5  0.74 0.08  0.83     0.07   0.47a 
Calibration 
 First 5  0.30 0.23  0.56     0.26    
 Last 5  0.33 0.09  0.36     0.20   0.21 
Note. partial eta squared effect size statistic is for interaction of variables condition 
(Feedback, FB, or No-Feedback, NFB) and time (first 5 and last 5 sessions completed by 
each therapist). 
aThe number of sessions completed by the therapist was utilized as a covariate for 
calculation of effect size. 
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received feedback slightly decreased on average. This effect was moderate in size 
(partial eta squared = .19).  ANCOVA results were not statistically significant. 
 
Rate of Therapeutic Change 
 Across all clients, the mean rate of change in OQ-45 scores was -0.53 (SD = 
2.86). In other words, the average client’s OQ-45 Total Score decreased by 
approximately one half of a point per session during the period of data collection.  
 In order to evaluate the possibility that therapists who made more accurate 
judgments would also demonstrate better therapeutic outcomes, the correlation between 
judgment accuracy and client rate of change was examined. The rate of change 
experienced by clients of individual therapists was unrelated to therapists’ judgment 
accuracy as measured by either hit rates, r(8) = .11, or the correlation of therapist 
estimates and OQ-45 change, r(8) = -.19. 
 The relationship between judgment accuracy and rate of change was also 
examined at the individual client level (without collapsing means by therapist). The hit 
rate of therapist judgments for individual clients was not related to the rate of change 
experienced by the clients, r(37) = -.04.  Therefore, clients whose therapists made more 
accurate judgments about their progress were no more likely to experience positive 
change. 
 Clients of therapists in the feedback condition demonstrated more rapid symptom 
reduction (M = -0.77, SD = 1.48) as compared to clients of therapists who did not receive 
feedback (M = -0.04, SD = 0.90).  The observed effect of feedback condition was 
moderate, Cohen’s d = 0.61. 
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Confidence 
 Therapists tended to report high levels of confidence in their estimates of client 
progress since the previous session, and since their first session with the client.  The 
mean confidence rating for judgments regarding change from the first session was 0.84 
(SD = .09, Range = .68 to .95). Similarly, confidence ratings for judgments regarding 
change from the previous session averaged .80 (SD = .07, Range = .66 to .88). The 
correlation between confidence and judgment accuracy was investigated through 
examination of the correlation between therapists’ confidence ratings and hit rates for 
judgments regarding change from the previous session.  A negative correlation was 
observed, r(8) = -.42.  Overall, therapists who reported greater confidence in their 
judgments tended to be less accurate. Confidence ratings for judgments of change from 
the previous session were negatively correlated with the number of sessions completed by 
the therapist, r(8) = -.60. A negative relationship was also observed between the number 
of sessions completed and confidence ratings for judgments of change from the first 
session, r(8) = -.44. Results indicated that as the number of sessions completed by a 
therapist increased, confidence scores tended to decrease. 
 The effect of feedback on therapists’ confidence ratings was explored by 
examining mean confidence ratings by group and time. Each therapist’s first and last 5 
confidence ratings were utilized as endpoints for the time factor. The number of sessions 
completed by each therapist was used as a covariate for the analysis. Confidence ratings 
regarding estimates of change from the first session with the client to the time of 
judgment were examined first.  Confidence ratings increased slightly from the first 5 (M 
= .82, SD = .08) to the last 5 sessions (M = .85, SD = .10).  This effect was relatively 
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large, partial eta squared = .25.  Results indicated that therapists in the no-feedback 
condition made higher confidence ratings at the last 5 sessions than at the first 5 sessions.  
In contrast, confidence ratings for therapists who received feedback slightly decreased 
from the first 5 to the last 5 sessions.  The effect of this interaction was large, partial eta 
squared = .60.   
 The effect of feedback on confidence ratings was also evaluated utilizing 
confidence ratings regarding client change from the previous session. Confidence ratings 
tended to decrease from the first 5 sessions (M = .82, SD = .07) to the last 5 sessions (M = 
.78, SD = .09), representing a large effect of time, partial eta squared = .54.  Examination 
of means indicated that confidence ratings tended to decrease for therapists who received 
feedback, whereas ratings remained similar for therapists who did not receive feedback.  
This effect was relatively large, partial eta squared = .47.  Results were consistent for 
both confidence ratings, in that final ratings were lower for therapists who received 
feedback than for those in the no-feedback condition.  In both cases, the time by 
condition interaction effect was large. 
 
Calibration 
 In addition to the raw value of confidence ratings, the appropriateness of 
confidence ratings was examined by calculating calibration scores for each therapist. 
Calibration scores reflect the absolute difference between a therapist’s overall judgment 
accuracy (hit rate) and average confidence rating related to the specific judgment 
(estimating the direction of client progress from the previous session). Lower scores 
therefore indicate better calibration, with a score of 0.0 denoting perfect calibration. The 
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mean calibration score across therapists was .45 (SD = .18), which reflected a general 
pattern of confidence ratings (M = .80) being greater than hit rates (M = .36). Individual 
therapists’ calibration scores varied considerably, from near-perfect calibration in one 
therapist (.02) to very poor calibration (.65). The relationship between calibration scores 
and the number of sessions completed by the therapist was negative, r(8) = -.38, 
indicating that calibration scores tended to improve (decrease) slightly as the number of 
sessions increased. 
 Calibration scores were examined as a function of group and time. On average, 
calibration improved from the first 5 (M = .43, SD = .26) to the last 5 sessions (M = .35, 
SD = .15; this effect was moderate, partial eta squared = .13.  Calibration improved 
among therapists in the no-feedback condition from baseline to the conclusion of data 
collection; for therapists in the feedback condition, calibration remained similar from 
baseline to the conclusion of data collection.  Although this effect was notable, partial eta 
squared = .21, it was primarily due to pre-intervention differences between groups; 
calibration was similar between groups at outcome. 
 
Stability of Variables 
 In order to examine the degree to which individual differences in study variables 
were stable over time, the correlation of individual therapists’ scores at the first and last 5 
sessions was examined.  Results are summarized in Table 4.  Hit rates at baseline were 
not predictive of hit rates at outcome; in contrast, there was a moderate relationship 
between accuracy as measured by correlation from baseline to outcome, indicating that 
therapists who were more responsive to fluctuations in client progress tended to remain 
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so over time.  Confidence was highly stable for judgments regarding client progress from 
both the most recent and from the first session.  Calibration (which is calculated on the 
basis of hit rate and confidence and therefore not independent) was moderately stable 
over time. 
 
Table 4 
Stability of Variables within Therapists from First 5 Sessions to Last 5 Sessions 
Variable       r   df          
Judgment Accuracy 
 Hit Rate  -.17  (6)   
 Correlation   .39  (5)   
Confidence 
 From First   .60  (8)   
 From Previous  .68  (8)   
Calibration    .35  (6)       
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
 The primary purpose of the present study was to examine the effect of 
standardized feedback on the accuracy of therapists’ judgments regarding client progress.  
Judgment accuracy was estimated in two distinct methods: 1) calculation of a “hit rate” 
for each therapist (i.e., the proportion of total estimates in which the direction of change 
estimated by the therapist was congruent with the direction of change indicated by the 
OQ-45); and 2) examination of the correlation between therapist estimates of change and 
OQ-45 change scores.  Both methods therefore relied upon OQ-45 data as an indicator of 
client status; the limitations of this approach are discussed below.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, these two methods of operationalizing judgment accuracy were not related; 
improvements in the overall correlation between therapist and OQ-45 estimates did not 
predict improvement in hit rates.  In some cases, therapists’ estimates paralleled changes 
in the OQ-45 but remained inaccurate in the absolute direction of change specified.  In 
other cases, therapists’ estimates were more accurate in terms of hit rate but did not tend 
to covary with OQ-45 changes.  Generally, judgment researchers have used the “hit rate” 
method as a primary measure of judgment validity (accuracy), in part because many 
studies examine categorical judgments (e.g., diagnosis); however, research regarding 
more dimensional or quantitative judgments, such as client progress, may also utilize the 
correlation method.  Given that both methods appear to measure different outcomes, it is 
unclear whether one method is to be favored; future research may benefit from 
incorporating both methods.  It is notable that the correlation method was more stable in 
the current study and may therefore be preferred, particularly for research involving small 
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sample sizes.  An alternate approach would be to have therapists estimate the client’s 
current status at the time of session using a standardized measure (e.g., Global 
Assessment of Functioning), without directly comparing the status to a previous point.  
This would allow for comparison of parallel judgments made by clients and therapists; 
however, this approach would be a less direct means of examining the extent to which 
therapists estimate accurately client progress, which requires not only a judgment of 
current status but also judgment and recall of client status at a previous point in time. 
 Overall judgment accuracy was surprisingly low in the current study as measured 
by either method of assessing accuracy.  The overall hit rate for estimates of the direction 
of client change was 0.36, which represents approximately chance performance (as the 
three possibilities were improvement, deterioration, or no change).  Similarly, the overall 
correlation between therapists’ estimates and progress as measured by the OQ-45 was -
.01.  Accuracy increased only slightly from baseline to the conclusion of data collection; 
however, accuracy did increase as the number of judgments made by the individual 
therapists increased.  This relationship was particularly notable for accuracy as measured 
by correlation, which was strongly related to the number of sessions completed by the 
therapist (r = .57).  It is possible that accuracy as measured by hit rates is limited by 
therapists’ tendency to be overly optimistic regarding the direction of change, and 
particularly by therapists’ hesitance to rate clients as deteriorated. Therapists may have 
become more attuned to fluctuations in client progress over time while continuing to 
overestimate the absolute amount of change being made.  (And given the slow progress 
that is typical for many psychotherapy clients, such “naïve optimism” on a therapist’s 
part may not be entirely undesirable as prevention against burnout.) 
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In a previous study (Haderlie, 2009), judgment accuracy as measured by 
correlation increased dramatically over time among novice therapists at the beginning of 
their first practicum experience.  Therapists in the current study were primarily first-year 
practicum students as well, although they had been practicing for approximately 6 
months prior to the beginning of data collection.  It is possible that therapists orient 
relatively quickly to client status as they begin to accrue clinical experience, and 
therefore improvements were less notable in the current study.  Another possibility is that 
repetition with the judgment task itself (i.e., repeatedly engaging in the process of 
considering available data and making a judgment regarding client change) leads to 
improved accuracy; this hypothesis is supported by the relationship between the number 
of judgments made and accuracy in the current study, although the relationship was 
relatively weak when looking at hit rates.  The overall effect of time may have been 
restricted due to the fact that therapists completed varied numbers of sessions, and in 
some cases therapists completed relatively few sessions (minimum was 11). 
 Feedback did not have a positive effect on judgment accuracy in the current study 
as measured by either method of assessing accuracy, and was in fact detrimental to 
accuracy in both cases.  As estimated by either method, judgment accuracy decreased 
slightly across time for therapists who received feedback.  Conversely, therapists in the 
no-feedback condition demonstrated relatively large improvements in judgment accuracy 
over time, as measured by either method.  It is clear that feedback did not improve 
judgment accuracy in the current sample, contrary to the original hypothesis.  Given the 
extended theoretical literature suggesting that feedback is a crucial element of improving 
clinical judgment, the observed pattern was unexpected.  It should be noted that the 
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trends in the current study are based on small sample sizes and would need to be 
replicated.  It is possible that the relatively delayed nature of feedback in the current 
methodology decreased its effectiveness.  Additionally, timing differences in the 
administration of the OQ-45 (before session) and the TEC (after session) may have 
limited the validity of OQ-45 results as a means of providing feedback regarding the 
accuracy of therapists’ judgments, given that therapists may have been estimating client 
status at a different point in time than clients were reporting it.  Current results were also 
influenced by initial differences between groups at baseline.  Judgment accuracy as 
measured by hit rates was higher at the outset for therapists in the feedback condition; 
outcome accuracy was similar between groups.  The observed effect was therefore 
shaped largely by chance variability at baseline. 
 Individual therapists varied widely in judgment accuracy, by either measure of 
accuracy.  Individual differences in judgment accuracy were moderately stable when 
accuracy was assessed through the correlation method (but not when assessed by hit 
rates).  It remains unclear, on the basis of current data, whether the ability to make 
accurate judgments of client progress has applied benefit in psychotherapy.  Presumably, 
therapists who are more attuned to client progress would have advantages in recognizing 
poor responses early and adjusting treatment plans.  Additionally, judgment regarding 
progress is important in deciding when to discontinue treatment; accurate judgment 
would therefore be expected to contribute to the efficient use of therapy resources.  
However, these possibilities remain theoretical and are in need of further investigation. 
 The overall rate of change observed in the current sample was relatively flat; 
clients demonstrated a mean reduction in OQ-45 Total Scores of 0.53 points per session, 
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after controlling for unequal observations across therapists.  It is worth noting that a 
majority of clients in the current study were seen at the CICFC, a low-cost community 
mental health clinic in which clients are often seen over the course of one or more years.  
Therefore, a high proportion of clients in the sample were not in the initial phase of 
treatment and treatment response might therefore have reached a plateau, consistent with 
research on the dose-effect relationship in psychotherapy (e.g., Howard et al., 1986; 
1993).  Despite the relatively limited rate of change, a moderate effect of feedback was 
observed; clients whose therapists received feedback demonstrated a mean reduction of 
0.77 points per session, in comparison to a mean reduction of 0.04 points for clients in 
the no-feedback condition.  This trend was consistent with a burgeoning research 
literature supporting the treatment utility of progress feedback to therapists (e.g., Brodey 
et al., 2005; Lambert, 2007; Slade et al., 2006). 
 The current study examined the relationship between clinical judgment and client 
outcomes.  It is notable that although there was a trend for feedback to lead to improved 
rates of therapeutic change, feedback did not lead to improved clinical judgment 
accuracy.  Furthermore, the accuracy of therapists’ judgments regarding the progress of 
individual clients was statistically unrelated to the rate of change experienced by the 
clients.  Clinical judgment, therefore, was not shown in the current study to contribute 
meaningfully to client outcomes.  It seems likely that the therapeutic effects of feedback 
owe to separate mechanisms, which have not yet been demonstrated empirically.  One 
possibility is that therapists spend more time thinking about clients for whom they 
receive feedback; Percevic, Lambert, and Kordy (2004) described this possibility as the 
“attention effect.”  Increased attention may also lead to increased empathy or alliance.  
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This possibility may be examined by administering process measures in addition to 
outcome measures and examining the effect of feedback on process variables. 
 The most notable effect of feedback in the current study was on therapists’ ratings 
of confidence in the accuracy of their judgments.  When making estimates regarding 
change from both the first session and the most recent session, therapists who received 
feedback reported lower confidence over the course of the study, as compared to 
therapists who did not receive feedback.  The statistical magnitude of this effect was 
large in both cases, although the absolute magnitude of change in confidence ratings was 
modest.  Regarding overall confidence levels, therapists tended to be highly 
overconfident regarding their judgments, with mean confidence ratings above 80 percent.  
The decrease in confidence ratings therefore appears to have been an appropriate 
response to feedback, given that confidence ratings were consistently too high, even after 
they decreased somewhat due to feedback.   
Interestingly, confidence ratings were negatively related to judgment accuracy; 
therapists who reported higher confidence ratings tended to demonstrate lower hit rates.  
Given that confidence was negatively related to judgment accuracy (consistent with some 
previous research; Arkes, 1981), and that therapists tended to be overconfident, this 
appears to represent a desirable outcome of feedback administration.  Particularly among 
therapists in training, the reduction of overconfidence may provide clinicians with a 
degree of humility regarding the limitations of clinical judgment and inference.  
Somewhat inconsistently, therapist calibration did not improve as a function of receiving 
feedback.  However, the reliability of this latter finding may be limited, given that both 
components of calibration scores (hit rates and confidence ratings) were calculated on the 
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basis of small sets of 5 judgments.  It seems likely that a general trend of decreased 
confidence ratings would lead to better calibration over a longer period of observation. 
 
Limitations 
 Several limitations should be noted in interpreting current results.  A primary 
limitation was the small sample size of therapists who provided sufficient data for 
analyses (N = 10, 5 therapists in both conditions).  A repeated-measures design was 
utilized in order to maximize the number of observations and increase the reliability of 
individual variables for each therapist; however, the small sample size limited statistical 
power.  Thus the results were presented primarily based on effect sizes and other 
descriptive statistics.  All conclusions are therefore tentative, awaiting a study of 
sufficient size to employ inferential statistics.   
 Another consideration germane to the generalizability of results is the nature of 
the current sample of therapists.   With one exception, therapists were first-year 
practicum students in a doctoral clinical psychology program.  The sample was 
reasonably diverse in terms of gender and ethnicity; however, the extent to which current 
results would generalize to clinicians at varied levels of training and experience, and in 
various professional disciplines, remains unknown. 
 The accuracy of therapists’ judgments was measured in two methods in the 
current study.  However, both methods rely upon clients’ self-reported OQ-45 data as the 
criterion measure of progress.  Although self-report measures of distress have the 
advantages of objectivity and statistical reliability, no single measure of outcome or 
progress is completely sufficient.  Measurement of client progress would ideally be based 
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upon a multi-method assessment incorporating various approaches (e.g., self-report, 
observation, other-report, external behavioral data, or other-clinician ratings).  Reliance 
upon the OQ-45 was necessary in the current study due to practical limitations. 
 In order to evaluate criterion variables such as judgment accuracy and calibration, 
it was necessary to select baseline and outcome groups of observations for each 
individual therapist; for example, the correlation between therapists’ and OQ-45 
estimates of change could not be meaningfully examined by simply grouping one 
observation from each therapist within conditions.  The first and last 5 observations for 
each therapist were therefore utilized as baseline and outcome periods.  The selection of 5 
sessions was somewhat arbitrary and was largely based upon the limited number of 
sessions available for some therapists.  Although more reliable than a single observation, 
correlations utilizing only 5 pairs of data are highly influenced by single values; current 
results are therefore considered preliminary.  Future studies should incorporate larger 
sample sizes with more sessions completed. 
 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
 The current results did not provide support for the hypothesis that feedback would 
improve clinical judgments regarding client progress.  However, there was a trend for 
clients whose therapists received feedback to improve at a faster rate than clients whose 
therapists did not receive feedback.  It appears unlikely that improvement in clinical 
judgment was a significant mechanism in the therapeutic effects of feedback.  Future 
studies should continue to explore potential mechanisms of change. 
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 Although feedback did not improve the accuracy of clinical judgments, it did 
impact therapists’ confidence ratings regarding their judgments.  Although study 
therapists remained overconfident across the course of data collection, those who 
received feedback demonstrated reduced confidence ratings, in comparison to therapists 
in the no-feedback condition.  As noted above, the reduction of confidence ratings 
appears to have been a desirable outcome.  Programs designed to improve clinical 
judgment, and more specifically to reduce overconfidence in judgments, would benefit 
from the incorporation of feedback regarding the accuracy of judgments made. 
Additionally, the clinical impact of overconfidence among clinicians is relatively 
unexamined.  Future studies may examine potential clinical correlates of therapists’ 
confidence regarding clinical judgments.  This might be addressed through a process-
oriented approach examining a variety of variables over time (e.g., outcomes, number of 
sessions attended, number of sessions completed before making significant treatment 
decisions, proportion of clients referred to outside providers, frequency of consultation, 
etc.).   
 The number of sessions completed (and subsequent judgments made) by each 
therapist was related to several other variables.  As the number of judgments increased, 
judgment accuracy increased (more notably for accuracy as defined by correlation), 
confidence ratings decreased, and calibration improved.  It appears therefore that 
repetition with the judgment task was beneficial.  Repetition (i.e., making repeated 
judgments regarding client progress, across several clients) appeared to be more 
influential than feedback in increasing judgment accuracy.  On the basis of such results, it 
appears that providing clinicians with experience related to the specific judgment to be 
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made is important in developing clinical judgment.  Although experience has been 
inconsistently related to the accuracy of clinical judgment across judgment literature, the 
current results support Westen and Weinberger’s (2004) position that experience with the 
specific judgment task, rather than general clinical experience, is essential in making 
valid clinical judgments.  Experience effects may therefore be more notable when 
experience is considered in relation to the specific judgment task, rather than as a raw 
amount of time spent in clinical training and service.  The effect of repetition with a 
judgment task on the accuracy of judgments may be examined through experimental 
methods in which the number of judgments made is systematically varied. 
 In summary, although the current study did not find support for feedback as a 
means of improving judgment accuracy, feedback did affect confidence ratings in an 
apparently desirable manner.  Feedback may therefore be an important aspect of training 
programs related to clinical judgment and reducing overconfidence.  Current results were 
also consistent with a growing body of research supporting feedback to therapists as a 
positive intervention for clients.  Additionally, the present data suggest promising lines of 
further research on clinical judgment.  In particular, the effect of repeated experience 
with a specific judgment task on judgment accuracy should be examined. 
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APPENDIX 
MEASURES 
Therapist Registration Form.  
  
 
Please think of a 4-digit code number (e.g. 2345) that you will remember and use 
throughout the study.  Creating a code number will allow us to keep your responses 
completely anonymous.   
 
1.  Code number: ______________ 
 
2.  What is your highest level of education obtained in a mental health field? 
 
 □ Doctorate (Ph.D., Psy.D., Ed.D.) 
 □ Masters (M.A., M.S., M.F.T., Ed.M.) 
 □ Bachelors (B.A./B.S.) 
 
3.  What is your mental health field? (check one) 
    
 □ Clinical Psychology 
 □ Counseling Psychology 
 □ Educational Psychology 
 □ Marriage and Family Therapy 
 □ Other 
 
4.  For how long (in months or years) have you conducted psychotherapy (including 
training experience)?  ____________________ 
 
5.  Have you previously utilized the OQ-45 in clinical practice?   □ Yes □ No 
 
 IF YES: For approximately how long?  _____________________ 
   Did you receive computer-generated feedback? □ Yes □ No 
 
 
 
 
Please provide your demographic information on the following page but DO NOT 
write your code number on that page.   
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Participant Demographics 
 
 
 
Age: ___________________ 
 
Gender:   □ Female □ Male 
 
Ethnicity: _________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Please see the next page regarding a drawing for a gift card.  After completing all 
pages, separate the three pages and place them in the research drop box in random 
order. 
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Entry for Gift Card Drawing 
 
 
Thank you for your participation in this research.  If you would like to be 
eligible to win one of two $25 gift cards to Barnes and Noble, please provide 
your email address below.  The drawing will be held following data 
collection and winners will be notified via email. 
 
 
Email address: _________________________________________________ 
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Therapist Estimate of Change 
 
 
 
Client #: ______________ Therapist ID (4-digit code): _________________ 
Date of Session: ________ Number of sessions you have had with this client: _______ 
(include current session) 
 
If this was your first session, check here _____ and do not complete the remainder of 
form. 
 
 
1.  In your judgment, how has your client’s status changed since the previous session? 
 
   1             2              3              4              5              6             7 
Much       Somewhat        Slightly            No        Slightly     Somewhat       Much 
Worse         Worse         Worse         Change                  Improved                Improved           Improved 
 
How confident are you in the accuracy of your judgment regarding the direction of change 
(worse, no change, or improved) since the previous session? 
  
30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
 
2.  In your judgment, how has your client’s status changed since your first session with the 
client? 
 
   1             2              3              4              5              6             7 
Much       Somewhat        Slightly            No        Slightly     Somewhat       Much 
Worse         Worse         Worse         Change                  Improved                Improved           Improved 
 
How confident are you in the accuracy of your judgment regarding the direction of change 
(worse, no change, or improved) since your first session? 
  
30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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